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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Mutual funds and hedge funds are popular forms of investment
States

and throughout the world. Mutual funds are regulated by

the United States.

Hedge

in the

United

securities' regulators in

fimds, however, are not regulated because of their operational

flexibility in investment.

George Soros, manager of the famous Quantum Fund,
the industry of hedge funds; his

Quantum Fund recorded "4 1

is

a successful case in

percent net returns" per year

between 1990 and 1994.' However, the near-bankruptcy of the Long-Term
Capital

Management Limited

Partnership

two Nobel prize winners among

its

(LTCM),

"the Cadillac of hedge funds" with

partners,^ demonstrates the negative side of hedge

funds: this episode indicated even one hedge fund could threaten the world financial

market. In addition, while
the financial market, only

common hedge

fund failures followed the normal process in

LTCM was uniquely rescued by a consortium of fourteen

international institutions in

September 1998. This "unprecedented" rescue underlined the

"irony," or the "double standard" nature of the United States because

other countries including Asian countries

M. Corey Goldman, House Eyes Fund Rules
Little

Too Late, CNNfn,

which had economic

America persuaded

crises to follow

Legislation Expected Thursday, though Experts

market

Deem

It

Too

Sept. 22, 1999. <http://cnnfh.com/1999/09/22/news/hedge>

Hedge Funds: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the House Comm. on Banking
and Financial Services, 106 Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Hearings 4] (opening statement of Marge
Roukema, Chairwoman) LTCM was the largest hedge fund by asset size in 1996. Beverly Chandler,
Investing with the Hedge Fund Giants 3 (1998).
;

Some famous partners are as follows: (1) John Meriwether who pioneered fixed-income arbitrage at
Salomon Brothers and was Salomon vice chairman; (2) David W. Mullins Jr. who was vice chairman of the

discipline in dealing with defaulted

dealing with

companies/ yet

it

failed to use

1994.^

During the committee meeting,

firnds

were

it

the risk of hedge funds

was mentioned

cited as a source of market volatility in the

on April

that "highly leveraged

13,

hedge

1987 market break," and "highly

leveraged hedge funds appeared to have played a role in the

lightly

in

LTCM.

The House banking committee discussed

crisis."^

such discipline

1

992 European currency

Regulators, however, treated the risks of hedge funds to national banks very

and thought that banks could control those

small. ^ In addition, after the

risks because their credit exposure

was

European bond market turbulence, the central bankers of the

Group often countries considered

the regulation of hedge funds but did not decide

immediate regulation.

upon

.

Since the Asian financial crises in the late

1

997, there have been debates about the

impact of the speculative activities of hedge funds on the Asian financial market and

emerging markets.

'

However, most advanced countries and

communities had not concerned themselves with the
near-collapse of LTCM,

international financial

activities

most developed countries and the

of hedge funds.

Since the

international financial

Myron Scholes who was

the 1997 Nobel economics prize winner; and (4)
Nobel economics prize wiimer.
See Risks that Hedge Funds pose to the Banking System: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 103'^'' Cong. (1994) [hereinafter Hearings 1] (written testimony of Henry T. C.
Hu, Professor of Law, University of Texas).<http://www.house.gov/banking/10198wit.htm>

Federal Reserve Board; (3)

Robert Merton

^

Mark

^

Hearings

who was

Jickling,
1,

the 1997

Hedge Funds,

5,

Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, (June 21, 1994).

supra note 4 (statement of Hon. James A. Leach).

'Id
^
The credit exposure of eight national banks was no more than $526 million at that time. Id. (testimony of
Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller, OCC).
^
See Mark Jickling, supra note 5, at 5.
'"
See Takehiko Nakao, Hedge Funds and International Financial Markets (July 1999).
<http;//www.mof go.jp/englishyififD06. htm>; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets of the
House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 106* Cong. (1999)[hereinafter Hearings 5] (testimony
of Leon M. Metzger, President, Paloma Partners Co., LLC), <http://www.house.gov/banking/3399wit.htm>

if..

'

<..>.,

community have become concerned about the impact of hedge funds on
market.'^ In response to this, Congress had a hearing again on October

near- failure of

LTCM caused by high leverage.

Disclosure Act"

the financial

1,

1998 due to the

Consequently, "The Hedge Fund

was introduced by a Congressman

into the

House of Representatives.

Regulation of hedge funds was considered on several occasions.

No

was taken because of the lack of "conclusive evidence" of "market

action,

however,

volatility"'''even

though the impact of hedge funds on the financial market was very powerful '^because of
their aggressive trading strategies

and leverage.

U.S. regulators are concerned that

if they regulate

hedge funds, hedge

However,

along with their economic benefits, emigrate to offshore havens.

fiinds will,

if

we

consider the importance of the American financial markets in the world, this idea can be

dismissed.

Due

to globalization in the capital markets, small events in the

can have large effects

in the

world market. In addition, the bankruptcy of hedge funds

can have severe consequences as

we

can see

why the

Federal Reserve

" See Takehiko Nakao, supra note 10; See World Economic Outlook, IMF,
[hereinafter Outlook

May

United States

I,

5,

Bank of New York

Box

1

(May 1998)

1998].

See Takehiko Nakao, supra note 10; ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) discussed ways to curb hedge fund
and Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) will discuss the need to urge banks to restrict
their lending to hedge funds. Japan LDP to Debate Ways to Curb Hedge Funds, REUTERS, Jan.26,
999 <http://www. http://biz.yahoo.com/r£'990 1 26/b4a.html>
'^
H.R.2924, 1 06* Cong. ( 1 999).
'^

activity,

1

'"*

Mark

'^

See Hearings

Jickling,

supra note

3,

5, at 1.

supra note 10 (testimony of Lewis A. Sachs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Dept. of

the Treasury).
'^

See Report of The President's Working Group on Financial Markets, Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the

Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management (April, 1999)[hereinafter The President
Report], <http://www.cftc.gov/tm/hedgefundreport.htm>

's

Working Group

Hedge Fund Operations: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 105
Cong. (1998) [hereinafter Hearings 2] (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, FED), (testimony of
Richard R. Lindsey, Director, SEC) <http://www.house.gov/banking/10198wit.htm>; The Managed Funds
'

managed futures funds, criticized the
Working Group Report. Michael Schroeder, Hedge Funds Blast Plan [for] Disclosure of
Internal-Financial Data, Dow JONES Newswires, May 7, 1999.
Association, a trade group that represents 700 hedge funds and
President's

(FRBNY)

intervened in

LTCM's

recapitalization.

In addition, there

was a suggestion

that the United States should be the first to enact legislation regulating

most hedge funds

are in America,

and such regulation would be very

Therefore, regulation of hedge funds by the United States

hedge funds since

effective.'

is vital.

This paper will explain the hedge funds industry, explore the definition of hedge
fimds, their structure, their investors, and their effects

on the

financial market.

It

will also

evaluate the difference in securities regulation between mutual funds and hedge funds. In

particular,

it

will fully discuss

debacles. In addition,

conclusion,

it

it

some problems

in the

will explain the activities

will present

my suggestions

LTCM episode and other hedge fund

of the financial community. In

for regulation.

'*

See World Economic Outlook and International Capital Markets Interim Assessment, III, 54, Box 3.4,
(Dec. 1998) [hereinafter Outlook Dec. 1998]; There were concerns about possible disruptions in the
U.S. and global marketplace if LTCM had failed. Hearings 2, supra note 17 (testimony of Richard R.
Lindsey, Director, SEC); Recently, Tiger Management Funds (Tiger), one of the biggest hedge ftinds in the
world, announced plans to liquidate all investment in the market. In fact. Tiger was an example of a
successful hedge fund, and it has been in the spotlight since 1980. Because of Tiger's high returns, many
hedg fiinds were incorporated in the financial market. It started with capital of $8.8 million in May of

IMF

1980, and its capital reached $21 billion in 1999. Its compound average return was 3 1 .7 percent, but since
August of 1998, its profit has declined. This episode indicates that there seem to be some warning signs in
the hedge fund industry. Jennifer Karchmer, Tiger Management Closes its doors, CNNfn, March 30, 2000

<http://cnnfn/2000/03/30/mutualfunds/q_ftinds_tiger>
'^

Takehiko Nakao, supra note

10.

,

CHAPTER II
THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY
Origin and Development

Even though hedge funds have only come
is

J

not short. Alfred

949

20

jj^ f^^j.^ j^g

W. Jones made

^^g ^

While he was preparing
1

949, he found

new

the first

hedge fund as a general partnership on

sociologist, then a journalist,

investment

He changed

He used unique

and

at last

skills in the financial

his investment

systems,

i.e.,

market.

Jan.

1

became a fund manager.

for his article "Fashions in Forecasting" in Fortune in

some market risks produced by holding "a long
strategy. ^^

into the spotlight recently, their history

He

March

planned to reduce

stock position" with "market-neutral"

method "from market timing

short sales, leverage,

and incentive

to stock picking."^^

fees, for the first time in

the financial market.^"* In the beginning, he used a limited partnership

with several independent portfolio managers. After

that,

which invested

he changed his hedge fund from

a general partnership to "a multi-manager hedge fund" in 1952.
Carol

J.

Loomis used publicly

Fortune magazine
article introduced

^^

Matthias Bekier,

the

name "hedge

fionds" for the first time in her

"The Jones Nobody Keeps

Up

a "hedge fund" managed by Alfred

W.

article,

MARKETING OF HEDGE FUNDS

With," in April 1966.^^ The
Jones; the fund's performance

73 (1996).

Hedge Funds: Survival & Performance 1989-1995, 3 (Jan. 2, 1998);
William N. Goetzmann, Hedge Funds, Yale School of Management BZW Presentation (1997)
<http://viking.som.yale.edu/will/presentations/hedge/scd003.htm>; Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and
the Collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, 189, 13 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 2, (1999).
^^
Phillipp Cottier, HEDGE FUNDS AND MANAGED Futures 13 (1997).

^*

Stephen

J.

Brown

et al.,

Offshore

''Id
'*

Beverly Chandler, supra note

''Id

2, at 3.

after the

20 percent incentive

was

fee

better than

most mutual

ftands'

performance, which

surprised the financial community.

After that,

many hedge

within a few years?^

Many

fimds appeared: a hundred hedge funds were operating

fiind

managers, however, were confronted with high losses

and bankruptcy during 1969 and 1970.^^ Hedge funds had a hard time again during 1973
and

1974.^*^

Moreover, many hedge funds had problems

1994 because of "the strong

in

increase of American interest rates," but the hedge fund industry recovered in

1

995 and

1996.^^

The 1968 survey of the

Securities

and Exchange Commission (SEC) found

approximately 140 hedge funds in operation

among 215

partnerships, but the hedge fund

industry has developed enormously since the late 1960's

liberalization,

:

due

to global financial

hedge funds have increased and could have "internationally diversified

portfolios."^^

Nowadays, estimates

for the

number of hedge funds operating and

for the

amount

of assets they manage vary. For example, the Report of President's Working Group on
Financial Markets (hereinafter President's

Working Group

report) indicated that about

2,500 to 3,500 hedge funds were managing $200 to $300 billion in capital as of mid1998^'*

and handled about $800

^^

Stephen

^^

Barry Eichengreen

No.166,

J.

Brown

IMF(May

et al.,

billion to $1 trillion in total assets.^^

supra note 21,

et al.,

Stephen

Phillipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 13.

''

^

27, Occasional Paper

1998).

^^

Brown

other hand,

at 4.

HEDGE FUNDS AND FrNANCIAL MARKET DYNAMICS

^*

J.

On the

et al.,

supra note 21,

at 4.

Id. at 14.

The President's Working Group Report, supra note
& Performance 1989-1995 4 (Jan. 1998).
Barry Eichengreen et al., supra note 27, at 5.

Survival

"
'Ud

16;

Stephen

J.

Brown

et al.,

Offshore

Hedge Funds:

the estimate of Mar/Hedge, a major source database

that 1,100

hedge funds were managing $92.2

on hedge fund performance, showed

billion in assets in 1997."^^

Van Hedge Fund

Advisors, a Nashville, Tennessee-based investment advisory firm, estimated that there

were about 5,830 hedge funds worldwide.

The

position of the hedge funds industry

is

small relative to other investment

TO

For example, the volume of other investment

vehicles in the U.S. financial markets.

sectors in total assets as of the

end of 1998 was as follows: "

$4.1 trillion, (2) mutual funds

had $5

trillion, (3) private

(1)

commercial banks had

pension funds had

4.3 trillion, (4) State and local retirement funds had $2.3 trillion, and (5) insurance

companies had $ 3.7
According
control less than

^^

trillion."

to data

of the President's Working Group report, most hedge funds

$100 million

have capital with more than $
In the 1994

in capital.

1

billion

Hedge/Mar ranking,

there

'*°

In addition, the

is ver>'

number of hedge funds

small, and just a

few exceed $

that

5 billion.'*'

were 57 hedge funds which had over $100 million

under management.

Activities

and Influence

Even though hedge funds occupy only a small portion of the
their

impact

is

severe due to their leverage and highly aggressive trading strategies.

'^

Beverly Chandler, supra note

^^

M. Corey Goldman, supra note 1.
The President 's Working Group Report, supra note

^*

financial market,

2, at 23.

16.

''Id.

''Id

'Ud
*^

Matthias Bekier, supra note 20,

'*'

See The President 's Working Group Report, supra note

at

523-24.
16.

^^

8

Hedge funds use various investment methods including highly
more

subjective factors. Usually, hedge funds use

quantitative techniques or

more aggressive

positions than mutual funds. In particular, hedge fund managers

derivatives and short

want

to get "absolute

returns" because of their performance fee system.

There are different theories regarding the impact of hedge funds on the world
financial market.

Some

argue that hedge funds

make markets

efficient

because

they provide liquidity and stability and assert that hedge funds can affect the "financial

innovation and the reallocation of financial risk."

funds jeopardize the viability of sovereign states."

In contrast, others claim that "hedge

For example, the Prime Minister of

Malaysia criticized the actions of hedge funds for causing his country's financial

Hedge

funds, however, only had "short positions" in the Thailand baht during the Asian

economic

crises: they

had "long positions"

and "no significant positions"

in Indonesia,

in the Philippines.

hedge funds have not played an important role

few

''^

crisis.

"modest positions"

in Malaysia,

Recent research has also shown that

in the financial

market

crises

of the past

years.

^ee Beverly Chandler, 5MjPra note

2, at 3.

'*^

The President 's Working Group Report, supra note 16.
*^
Hearings 2, supra note 17 (opening statement of James A. Leach, Chairman).
''^
He accused Soros [hedge funds] of speculating in the Malaysian ringgit in the summer of 1997. Beverly
Chandler, supra note 2, at xiii.
"**

Even though hedge funds had approximately $7

important role

in the crisis.

billion transactions in Thailand,

hedge funds did not play

Barry Eichengreen and Donald Mathieson, Hedge Funds: What

Do We Really

Knows? Economic Issue 19, IMF (Sept. 1999) <http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/issuesl9/index.htm>
Stephen J. Brown et al.. Hedge Funds and the Asian Currency Crisis of 1997, 13, NBER Working Paper
No. 6427 (Feb. 1998); Hearings 3, supra note 10 (testimony of Leon M. Metzger); Hearings 2, supra note
"^^

A study on foreign investors' herding effect before
economic crisis found no evidence that foreign investors had negative effect on
Korea's stock market. Hyuk Choe, et al., Do Foreign Investors Destabilize Stock Markets? The Korean
Experience in 7997 21, NBER (June 1998).
17 (opening statement of James A. Leach, Chairman):

the period of Korea's

Performance

Hedge fund's performance has generally
profits than Standard

returned

more than

and Poor's

S&P

indicated that hedge funds return

more

500 stock index, and some hedge funds have

other investment vehicles which have had bad returns.

^°

However, a

study of offshore hedge funds' performance illustrated that average armual offshore

hedge

fiind returns

^^

The President

^'

Stephen

J.

's

from 1989 to 1995 were lower than the

Working Group Report, supra note
et al., supra note 21, at 10.

Brown

16;

Mark

S&P

Jickling,

500

returns.^'

supra note

5, at 3.

CHAPTER III
THE LEGAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HEDGE FUNDS
Mutual Funds Structure
Definition

A mutual fund is "an investment company that pools money from
shareholders wherein the capital

Section 4 of the Investment

three classes: (1)

and

(3)

is

invested in a diversified portfolio of securities."

Company Act (ICA)^

"Face-amount

divides investment companies into

certificate company,"^"* (2) "

"Management company." Management companies

Unit Investment

trust,"

are again classified into

"open-end companies," and "closed-end companies."^^ The so-called "mutual fund"
CO

C-7

an "open-end investment company."

colloquially termed

company

is

is

"any investment company which

redeemable security of which

it is

is

The open-end investment

offering for sale or has outstanding any

the issuer."^^ There

is

also another classification of

mutual funds: (1) stock or equity, (2) bond and income, and (3) money market.

The advantages of investing
management,

(2) diversification, (3)

^^

in

mutual funds are many:

economies of scale,

Robert C. Pozen, The Mutual Fund Business
" 15U.S.C. §80a-4.

Face-amount

^^

Unit investment trusts are a fixed pool of securities. Gould

is

(4) liquidity, (5)

convenience

16 (1998).

^'*

certificate

(1) professional

debt obligation. 15 U.S.C. §80a-2(a)(15).

& Lins,

Unit Investment Trusts, 43 Bus.

LAW.

1177-1205(1988).

^M5

U.S.C. §80a-5(a).

'^

Joseph R. Fleming, Regulation of Series Investment Companies under The Investment
44 Bus. Law. 1179n. 1 (1989).
^*

Investment Co.

^M5
^^

Inst. v.

Camp, 401

U.S. 617 (1971).

U.S.C. §80a-5(a)(l).

Robert C. Pozen, supra note 52,

at 16.

10

Company of 1940,

11

and ease of record-keeping, (6)

strict

government regulation, and

(7) full disclosure.

Structure

A mutual fund can be structured as a corporation or a business trust.
mutual funds have external management

styles. ^^

all

Thus, mutual funds are composed of

and independent contractors who operate mutual

affiliated organizations

In fact,

fUnds.^'*

In a typical mutual fiind, there are shareholders, a board of directors, an

investment adviser or management company, a distributor, a custodian, independent
public accounts, and a transfer agent.^^

management company manages

Among them, the

investment adviser or

the fund's portfolio according to the objectives described

in the fund's prospectus.^

Hedge Funds

Structure

Definition

Under
funds.^^

the securities regulations, there

Hedge funds

is

no precise

legal definition

of hedge

are described as "a variety of pooled investment vehicles that

are not registered under the federal securities laws as public corporations, investment

companies, or broker-dealers" or " any pooled investment vehicle that

is

privately

organized, administered by professional investment managers, and not widely available

to the public."^^

*'

See A Guide

to

Understanding Mutual Funds, 5 ,The Investment

Company

Guide] <http://www.ici.org >; See Victoria E. Schonfeld and Thomas M.

Mutual Fund, 49 BUS. Law
*^
See Guide, supra note 61
^^
See Id.
^ See Id.
" See Id

,

.

107 (Nov. 1993).

at 12.

^ See Id.
See The President's Working Group Report, supra note

16.

J.

Institute (1998) [hereinafter
Kerwin, Organization of a

12

The

investors of hedge funds are mainly wealthy individuals and sophisticated

institutional investors.

Because there

characteristics are often

used to determine whether an investment vehicle

ftind.^' In fact,

not

all

is

no clear definition of hedge funds,
is

their

a hedge

hedge funds use "hedging" even though Jones used "long and
77

short" skills in order to hedge.

There are some contradictions in the definitions of hedge funds. Whether hedge
funds could be described as mutual funds

is

questionable.

Soros defined hedge funds as

"a mutual fund that employs leverage and uses various techniques of hedging."^"* The

chairman of Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System (FED) stated that
a hedge fund, or a mutual ftind that

clientele to a small

is

number of highly

"LTCM

structured to avoid regulation by limiting

is

its

sophisticated, very wealthy individuals and that

seeks high rates of return by investing and trading in a variety of financial instruments."

On the

other hand.

my view, hedge

^*

Hearings

I,

Vanguard group provides

that

hedge funds are not mutual

funds.''

In

funds are kinds of derivatives of mutual fimds because hedge funds

supra note 4 (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC)

(testimony of Richard R. Lindsey, Director,
private limited partnerships

SEC)

;

;

Hearing

2,

and are exempt from regulation under the ICA. Hearings

(testimony of Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller,

supra note 17

Private investment vehicles that tend to be organized as
I,

supra note 4

OCC).

The President 's Working Group Report, supra note 16.
dijfer from Mutual Funds, The Vanguard Group (1999) [hereinafter Hedge Funds]
<http://www.vanguard.com/cgi-bin/NewsPrint/908307468>

™ How Hedge Funds
''

See Phillipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 15.
See Beverly Chandler, supra note 2, at 3.
" Other definitions are as follows: (1 ) an investment partnership or mutual that is unregulated; (2) one that
seeks high rates of return by investing or trading in virtually any form of financial instrument; (3) an entity
that may take long and short positions and invest in many markets; (4) an entity that uses leverage; and (5)
^^

an entity whose manager's compensation

is

based on

its

financial performance.

Hearings

1,

supra note 4

Member, FED).
Alternative Investment Management Association (AIMA), Hedge funds (1996); Beverly Chandler, supra
note 2, at 5; Hedge funds are basically "unregulated mutual funds." Mark Jickling, supra note 5, at 3.
(statement of John P. Laware,

Hearings

2,

supra note 17 (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, FED).

Hedge Funds, supra
note 5, at

1.

note 70;

Hedge funds

are "unregulated mutual fiinds." But See

Mark

Jickling,

supra

13

adopted their main structure from mutual funds, and their systems are similar to mutual
funds.

•

•

Classification

Hedge

can be classified according to the main investment strategy in the

ftinds

funds' management: (1) "global-macro" hedge funds which take positions grounded on

their predictions

of world macro-economic growths; (2) "event-driven" hedge funds that

invest in specific securities concerning bankruptcies, reorganizations, and mergers;

(3) "market-neutral"

hedge funds which use relative-value

are other classifications such as "long-only"

and

77

strategies.

In addition, there

hedge funds, "sectoral" hedge funds,
-TO

"dedicated short sales" hedge funds, and "funds of funds."
classified in their use

Hedge funds

are also

of different types of financial instruments: hedge funds trade equity

or fixed income securities and use exchange-traded futures contracts or over-the-counter

(OTC)

derivatives.

styles.

First,

Moreover, there are two classes of hedge funds by organizational

one or more people organize hedge funds with specific trading
7Q

philosophies;

second, an advising vehicle such as the trading departments of investment

banks or internationally active commercial banks.
Structure

In order to get "pass-through tax treatment" for investors' profits, hedge funds

usually use limited partnerships, limited liability companies, or other vehicles as their
Q

structure.

1

Investors and a sponsor or "a general partner,"

who

is

usually a

manager of

The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16.
et al., supra note 27, at 29.
'^
For example, Soros Fund Management, Tiger Management Corporation, and Steinhardt Management
Company. Hearings 1, supra note 4 (statement of John P. Laware, Member, FED).
'Ud.
"id.
See The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16.
'*

Barry Eichengreen

14

the hedge fund and has a Umited HabiHty through a

management company,

responsible for guiding investment and risk management.

are

Investment managers have

responsibihty for selecting and monitoring traders and investment advisers, and assisting

managers.

83

Characteristics

In general, hedge funds have five characteristics of operation unlike other

investment instruments.

First,

hedge fimds impose incentive fees according

Second, hedge funds usually have excessive and aggressive leverage.

performance.

Third, hedge funds seek short-term investment strategies.

established "offshore,"

i.e.,

partners also invest their

different

to their

Fourth, hedge funds are often

"domiciled outside the United States."

own money.

from mutual funds: "(1)

Fifth,

hedge fund

In short, hedge flinds have unique characteristics

free choice

of asset classes, (2) free choice of markets,
OQ

(3) free choice

of trading

style,

and

(4) free choice

of instruments."

Sophisticated Investors

There are three types of investors in securities regulations: (1) novices, (2)
reasonable investors, and (3) sophisticated investors. Usually wealthy individuals

have $5 million investment capacity and highly sophisticated
in

by

securities regulators

present no public policy interest.

*"
*^

See Philipp
See Id

Cottier,

supra note 22,

institutions are not

due to the belief that they can protect themselves and

As

sophisticated investors,

at 69.

The President's Working Group Report, supra note

16, at

''Id
''^Id
*^

institutional investors invest

hedge funds. These "high net worth" individuals and sophisticated

protected

who

The President's Working Group Report, supra note

16.

Appendix A.

endowment funds and

15

pension funds invest in hedge funds, and the proportion of such investors

because of hedge funds' high returns.
funds,

by

we

When we

is

increasing

think about the regulation of hedge

are confronted with this dilemma: should sophisticated investors be protected

securities regulation?

Effects outside

Hedge Funds

Hedge funds have a
market.

great deal of trading with other financial institutions in the

Hedge funds use leverage through repurchase agreements

and derivatives.^^ In order to get short-term

(repo), short position,

return, they also take high-risk, aggressive

speculation in the world financial market. Banks and securities firms can be lenders or

derivatives counterparties.

liquidation problems

The

counterparties of hedge funds are confronted with

when hedge

hedge funds' insolvency
firms.

'

may

funds go bankrupt.

repo and reverse repo counterparties,

OTC

prime brokers, futures clearing firms,

derivative counterparties, and loan

2, at 5.

^'

Philipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 15.

'^

See The President's Working report, supra note
See supra note 2 at 202.

^'

as

94

Beverly Chandler, supra note

16.

1 ,

''

See

Id.

^^

See

Id.

liquidation,

bring about severe problems for those banks and securities

Hedge funds' counterparties function

counterparties.

Because of wholesale

See The President 's Working Group Report, supra note

16.

CHAPTER IV
THE REGULATIONS OF HEDGE FUNDS AND MUTUAL FUNDS
Securities Regulation of Mutual

Funds

Registration Requirements

1.

Registration

Under

the ICA, every investment

SEC,^^ and the

it

are restricted

activities

company

is

required to register with the

of a registered investment company and persons connected with

by the ICA. In addition, a variety of SEC and private sanctions are

provided by the ICA. The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) requires every mutual

fund to register

its

shares.^^

The

Internal

Revenue Code (IRC) mandates

investment company register as a "regulated investment company"

2.

that every

for taxation.

Reporting Requirement

Mutual funds must disclose information

to their investors

about their

QO

management, holdings, fees and expenses, and performance.

Mutual funds must provide

a prospectus and a shareholder report to investors.^^ The mutual funds' objectives, fees

and expenses, and investment strategies must be stated
funds' performance

^'

'^
'^
'*

is

in the prospectus.

'^^

A mutual

reported by annual and semiannual shareholder reports.

101

15U.S.C. §§80a-7to-8.
15U.S.C. §§77ato77aa.
Victoria E. Schonfeld and Thomas M. J. Kerwin, supra note 61, at 107; I.R.C. § 851 (a).
See Dijference between Mutual Funds and Hedge Funds, The Investment Company Institute [hereinafter

Difference] <http://www.ici.org/issues/diff_mutual_hedge_ftind.html>

See Guide, supra note 61,
"^ See Id.

at 24.

16

17

Other Restrictions

The advertisements and

sales materials of mutual funds are restricted by the

National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD).

directors

who

Mutual funds must have

are responsible for extensive oversight of the fund's policies

and

procedure; at least forty percent of those directors must be independent of the fund's

management under Section

10(a) of ICA.'^"'

The

distributors of mutual funds are

regulated as broker-dealers under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange

Act).'°'*

In addition, the investment advisers of mutual funds are registered and regulated

by the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA).'°^

Securities Regulation of Hedge

Funds

Registration Requirements

Usually, hedge funds in the United States use the exemption provision of ICA to

get

more

flexibility in

management. '^'^ Thus, most hedge funds are "private" investment

companies exempted from Section
1

(c) (1)

0S

exemption,

3 (c) (1)

and 3

(c) (7).'^^ In

order to use the Section 3

hedge fund securities should not be owned by "more than 100

persons" or use "public offering." '°^ Thus, most hedge funds use private offerings and are

'''See Id.
'°^

Difference, supra note 98.

'°^

15U.S.C. §80a-10(a).
"^ 15 U.S.C.§78o (a)(1).
'^^

15U.S.C. §80b-3.

'°^

See The President's Working Group Report, supra note

16.

'''Id
''^
'°'

15U.S.C. §80 a-3 (c)(1).
The President's Working Group Report, supra note

16, at

Appendix A.

'
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exempt from

therefore

registration requirements

under Section 4 (2) of the Securities

Act"^ or under Regulation D.

Hedge funds

are only constrained

by "investment agreement" with

'

Before 1996, hedge fimds consisted of one general partner and 99 limited investors.
to the National Securities

to 500.

In addition, hedge funds must sell their

The purview of

securities only to "qualified purchasers" in order to use Section 3(c)(7).

"qualified purchasers"

is

as follows: "(1) any natural person

company

million in investments, (2) a family-ovmed

investments, (3) certain trusts, and (4) any person

that

who owns

owns

who owns and
1

1

to the

ICA by the NSMI

that investors in

in 1996.'^'^

T

experience for their

risk.

number and have

in

In other words, there is

on a

invests

Section 3(c)(7)

The idea behind Sections

hedge funds are very small

not less than $5

not less $5 million in

discretionary basis not less than $25 million in investments."

added

Due

maximum

Market Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMI), the

numbers of investor rose from 99

'

investors.

3(c)(1)

was

and 3(c)(7)

is

sufficient investment

"no significant public

interest."

In order to avoid the "public reporting requirements" of the Securities Exchange

Act (Exchange Act), hedge ftmds must have
15(a) of the Securities Act,
I

1

"" 15U.S.C.

^'^

Under Section

hedge funds can be excluded from registration as broker-

Hedge funds must

also file with the

SEC when managers

exercise investment

§77d(2).

Difference, supra note 98.

"Ms

U.S.C.§80a-3

(c)(7).

113

The President's Working Group Report, supra note
(testimony of Richard R. Lindsey, Director, SEC).
"''

500 shareholders.

Q

dealers.

'"

less than

The President's Working Group Report, supra note

16, at

Appendix B; Hearing 2, supra note 17

16, at

Appendix B; Hal

Wellons, International Finance -Transactions, Policy,

"^ See The President's Working Group Report, supra note
16, at Appendix B.
"^ See Joseph R. Fleming, supra note
57, at 1 184, n 27.
"' The President's Working Group Report, supra note
16, at Appendix B.
"* 15 U.S.C.
78o(a).
§

S. Scott

and Regulation

and Philip A.

1061 (1999).
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discretion over accounts having

more than $100 million

in equity securities.

Under

Section 203(b)(3) of the lAA, fund managers can be exempt from investment adviser

Unregulated advisers are regulated by antifraud clause under Section 206

registration.

ofthelAA.'^'
Other Restrictions

There are also limitations in the redemption and transferability of partnership
interests.

investors

Due

to these facts,

hedge funds are

illiquid

investment entities.

Hedge fund

do not have special government protection because they have sophisticated

knowledge of the
According

financial markets.

to "large trader

required to submit reports to

company's

security.

The

and large position reporting systems," hedge funds are

SEC when

they acquire at least

5% of a publicly traded

antifraud provisions can regulate hedge funds.

Even though

hedge funds are not registered under the ICA, they are regulated by the antifraud sections
of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.
Regulation in the

Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)

When a hedge
investors,

it

fund trades on U.S. Futures and Option Exchanges or has U.S.

must be registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission

"M5U.S.C. §78m(f).
'^°

15U.S.C. §80b-203(b)(3).
The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16, Appendix A.
'^^
See William N. Goetzmann, supra note 21 The Task Force on Hedge Funds, Report on Section 3 (c) (1)
the
Investment Company Act of 1940 and Proposals to Create an Exception for Qualified Purchases, 51
of
Bus. LAW. 773 (1996).
'^'

;

'^ Congress thought that the hedge funds did not involve "significant public policy issues" and were not
1, supra note 4 (statement of John P. Laware, Member,
FED); See Hedge Funds, supra note 70; See Steven Scheer, Hedge Funds Reject Calls for U.S. Govt.
Regulations, REUTERS, Jan. 28, 1999.
'^^
15U.S.C. §78m(d).
The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16, at Appendix A.

properly subject to federal regulation. See Hearings
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(CFTC)

as a

commodity pool operator (CPO) under

regulated as a

file its

CPO by the National

the

CEA.

The hedge fund

is

also

Futures Association (NFA). The hedge fund must

annual financial statements with

CFTC

Eind

NFA. The hedge

fund must provide

its

investors with copies of annual financial statements and quarterly reporters concerning

its

NAV as well as maintain books and records, and include all material disclosures in

offering

memoranda

to perspective investors.

Remedies

Hedge funds use

"private placement," so only a contract regulates dealings

between investors and hedge fund partners except
problems caused by hedge funds do not belong

in the case

of fraud. Thus,

if the

to the antifraud provision in the Securities

Act, investors can only get remedies due to the breach of contract or negligence of
'^^

trustee.

Part 30 of the
127

128

CFTC's

regulations.

See The Task Force on Hedge Funds, supra note 122.
See generally Beverly Chandler, supra note

2, at

182-187.

CHAPTER V
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MUTUAL FUNDS AND HEDGE FUNDS
Regulation

Mutual funds are regulated by the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, the rules of

NASD, the ICA, the lAA,

and IRC. However, hedge funds are not governed by those

regulations.''^^

Investors and

There are no

Minimum

Investment

restrictions regarding sophistication

of investors and

minimum

investment amounts to invest in mutual funds. However, with respect to hedge funds,
only sophisticated institutions and wealthy individuals can invest. Additionally, there

is

minimum

'^^

investment of usually $5 million or more for those investing in hedge funds.

Fees
Investors of mutual fiinds pay an annual fee of approximately 0.24-0.28%,

which

is

expenses

based on the fund's net
having regulatory

management

'^^

assets.

limits.

Mutual funds must disclose fees and
In comparison, there

and performance or incentive

fees'^'*

is

no limitation on

with respect to hedge funds.

'^^

See Difference, supra note 98.
See Hedge Funds, supra note 70.
'^'
Mutual funds' fees and expenses should be disclosed
prospectus. See Guide, supra note 61, at 26.
"^ NASD rules.
'^°

in

"a fee table"

in the front

'^''

Generally, fixed fee: 1-2 percent. William N. Goetzmann, supra note 21.

'^"^

Generally, incentive fee: 10-30 percent, typically 20 percent. Id.

21

of the funds'

'^^

a

22

Leverage
Securities regulations regulate a mutual funds' ability to leverage

money. The ICA

limits the issuance

mutual funds' investments

and borrow

of senior securities as an "asset coverage

in illiquid assets

must be limited

to 15 percent

test,"

of net

and

assets.

Additionally, the regulations require disclosure investment policies of mutual funds to

investors.

and

However, hedge funds

their policies.

fluids'] creditors

are not subject to restrictions pertaining to leveraging

Leverage can be restricted "only by the willingness of

and counterparties

sheet leverage ratio

is less

hedge

In typical hedge funds, a balance-

to provide it."

than two to one

[the

139

Liquidity

Mutual funds must value
prices.

However, there are no

their daily portfolio

and calculate

restrictions about investors'

their daily

redemption and no regulations

about their portfolio valuation and price calculation with respect to hedge funds.

'^^

136

137
'^^

See Guide, supra note 61, at 26.
The President's Working Group Report, supra note

16.

See Guide, supra note 61, at 26.
The President's Working Group Report, supra note

16, at

'''See Id
140

See Guide, supra note 61,

at 26.

Appendix A.

23

Table

1:

The difference between hedge funds and mutual funds
Hedge Funds

Regulations

-None

Mutual Funds

-The Securities Act of 1933
-The Securities Exchange Act of

1934
-The Investment

Company Act of

1940
-The Investment Advisers Act of

1940
-The National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. rules

-Sophisticated, high net-worth

Investors

-

About 63 million Americans

investors

(Wealthy individuals or
sophisticated financial
institutions)

Minimum

-$1,000 or less

-At least $5 million

investment

Fee system and

-Administrative fee (1-2%)

disclosure

-Incentive fee

(20%

-Administrative fee(0.24-28%)

or more)

-no limitation and disclosure on

-Limitation and disclosure on fee

fee system

system

Leverage

-Often used

-Restriction

Investment

-Do not disclose

-Disclose

Pricing

-No

Liquidity

-Restriction

-Compute pricing on daily basis
-Redemption shares on at least

on leverage and
borrowing money

policies
rule

on valuation or pricing
on redemption

daily basis

Antifraud

-Applicable

-Applicable

provision

Disclosure

Source: data

-No disclosure on holdings,

-Disclosure on management,

performance

holdings, fees and expenses, and

-Depend on voluntary

performance

agreement
from Investment Company

The Vangiuard Group,

Inc.

Institute

,

http://www.ici.org/issues/diff_mutual_hecige_fund.html.;

<http://www.vanguard.com/cgi-bin/Newprint/908307468>

CHAPTER VI

HEDGE FUND FRAUD AND DEBACLES
Manhattan Investment Fund Fraud Case

Review

On January

18,

2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) accused

Michael W. Berger,'"" a hedge fund adviser of securities

fraud.^"*^

The SEC

also charged

Manhattan Investment Fund Ltd. (MIF)*'*^ and Manhattan Capital Management
Berger established

management

fee,

MIF which had

''"

investors.

^"^^

Most

and only eight investors had U.S.

Berger and
inflated

MIF's

minimum

and a 20 percent incentive fee in April

$500 million from about 280
institutions,

a $250,000

and returns even though

Berger, the general manager and founder,

is

1996.'"*^

investors

He

1

percent

raised

more than

were European banks and

addresses.*"*^

MIF had been concealing huge

assets

investment, a

Inc.'"^"*

losses since

MIF

lost

September 1996. They

$300 million by betting against

a 29-year-old Austrian

who immigrated

to

America

in the

early 1990s.
''*'^

SEC, SEC Charges Hedge Fund and Its Adviser With Fraud Emergency Relief Ordered,

Litigation

Release No. 16412 (Jan. 19,2000). <http://www.sec.gov/enforce/litigrel/lrl6412.htm> Berger, MIF, and

Manhattan Capital Management Inc. were charged with "violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933 and SectionlO (b) and Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." In addition, Berger and
Manhattan Capital Management Inc. were charged with "violations of Section 206(1) and (2) of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940." Id.
'"'^An offshore hedge fund organized and managed by Berger and was a British Virgin Islands corporation.
Bear Stems was the fund's clearing broker. Financial Asset Management was the introducing broker. Fund
Administration Services (Bermuda) Ltd., an
''*'*

An

affiliate

of Ernst

offshore hedge fund that operates out of New York.

&

Young Bermuda, was an

administrator.

SEC Investigating Hedge Fundfor Possible

HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Jan. 19, 2000, at 4.
Manhattan Investment Fund 'No Malicious Wrongdoing' Claims Berger, Mar/Hedge (Jan. 17, 2000).
<http://www.marhedge.com>
'"^
A marketing firm in Paris raised much of the fund's capital from wealthy European investors. See
Mitchell Pacelle, Deals & Deal Makers: Hedge Fund Faces Scrutiny in SEC Probe, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17,
2000, at CI 7.

Misrepresentation,
'''^
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They paid more money than

high-flying Internet stocks.

investors

who wanted

to

redeem

their investments in order to hide

Furthermore, Berger informed investors that

and 14 percent

in 1997, 12 percent in 1998,

assets as

was

of August 31,1999.^^^ In

in fact

$27.9 million, and

its

Because Berger thought

the real shares' value to

that

were

was

and had over $427 million

in

untrue: the net market value that day

less than

$50

million.'^'

market and Internet-related stocks were overvalued,

he sold Internet stocks short with hope that those stocks would decline.
prices of many Internet stocks increased. Because the losses,

made

losses.

gained 15 percent in 1996, 30 percent

in 1999*'*'^

fact, this

assets

MIF

MIF's huge

fake account statements under the

However, the

$300 million, were huge, he

name of Financial Asset Management, an

introducing broker, even though his clearing broker. Bear Stems Cos. Inc.(BSC), sent
correct account statements.

the performance and value"

fiind's administrator,

^

The phony account statements

were provided to his fund's investors, potential investors, the

and the fund's auditor, Deloitte

When Berger sent false
machine

to

make

it

SEC Probes Hedge

'""
'^'^

& Touche's Bermuda affiliate.'^"*

information to the auditor, he reprogrammed his fax

look as though the information had been sent by Financial Asset

Fund: Manhattan Investment Fund's Profit Reports Subject of SEC Investigation,

CNNfn, Jan. 18,2000.
Fund Manager Accused of Fraud;
hidden from Investors,

that "materially overstated

L.

Investment:

SEC Says $300 million

A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2000,

at

in

Losses on Internet Stocks

Was

6 [hereinafter Fw^of Manager].

Mitchell Pacelle, supra note 146.

SEC,

5M;7ra note 142.

& Deal Makers: Fund Manager Concocted Fraud, SEC Suit Alleges, WALL St.
atC24.
'^^
See Fund Manager, supra note 148; he felt that many opportunities on the short position. See Mitchell
Pacelle, supra note 146.
153
Mitchell Pacelle, supra note 151
See SEC Charges Hedge Fund: Alleges Manhattan Investment Fund Gave False Statements to
'^"

Mitchell Pacelle, Deal

J.,

Jan. 19, 2000,

Investors,

CNNFN,

Jan. 19, 2000; Deloitte

years' financial reports from 1996 to 1998.

& Touche resigned recently and withdrew

its

approval of three

s
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Management. '^^ Even though the administer and the auditor

BSC, Berger advised

information from

information because

it

the ftind's administer and auditor to ignore

did not reflect the hedge fund's entire portfolio. '^^

operated as a "Ponzi scheme": old investors

out

more than

also received accurate

their share value

from

who redeemed

capital raised

BSC's

The fund was

their shares earlier

were paid

from new investors through Berger'
1

en

phony statements concerning the performance and value of MIF.
Problem
Berger

by betting

lied to his investors

This case clearly indicates that

Internet-related stocks.

true financial condition to

was

about MIF's worth: he did not disclose his huge losses

able to get

more

its

investors. In addition,

MIF

did not report

due to fake account statements,

investors. Furthermore, the misrepresentation started in

1

its

MIF

996 with

the creation of fictitious account statements. Berger misrepresented the fund's financial

condition to

its

independent auditor. The auditor believed Berger' s statements without a

doubt.

Berger admitted that "there have been substantial losses in the fund over the

few

years,

and the statements on performance were inaccurate." In addition, he

confessed that "

I

don't expect anyone to like me.

However, he did justify
anything.

In

The

his behavior

intention of what

I

by saying

I

feel

that "I

bad about the

made

entire situation."

mistakes, but

I

haven't stolen

did wasn't bad."'^^

my view, his actions were very harmful because his thoughts did not focus

the notion of trust, transparency, and the protection of investors. Probably, he only

'^'

'^^

last

Manhattan Investment Fund, Mar/HedGE
Id.

'''Id
"^ Mitchell Pacelle, supra note 146.

(Jan. 19, 2000).

<http://www.marhedge.com>

on
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concentrated on making profits without considering good methods.
excellent results with flexible

investors, they

management of money.

would not have invested

their

If he

He just wanted

had told the

to get

truth to his

money. Berger was aware of that,

thus,

he

did not report the truth to his investors.

According to BSC's statement,
investor contacted

[BSC] seeking

where [BSC] reports have,

for the

BSC

noticed Berger's misrepresentation

to verify a reported strong

few

performance for the fund,

years, indicated significant losses.

"'^*^

statement explains that the disclosure and investor protections are problems.

that investors did not receive the true financial statements

This case also indicates that

which

is

MIF had problems

"when an

from the fund's

This

It

means

auditor.

in "mark-to-market practice"

used in hedge funds to prohibit the hiding of losses and encourage the proper

resolution of problems.'^' In sum, this case demonstrates that the

main problems

in

hedge

funds are transparency, disclosure, the role of the independent outside auditor, and an

independent regulation system. In order to solve those problems,

it is

necessary to

regulate hedge funds with respect to disclosure and transparency.

'^^
'^°

Jaye Scholl, Boom! A Bet Against Stocks Blows up Fund, BARRON'S 27 (Jan. 17, 2000).
Manhattan Investment Fund, Mar/HEDGE (Jan. 18, 2000). <http://www.marhedge.com>
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Hedge Funds Debacles
Askin Capital Management
1.

(ACM)

Review
In 1994. three

hedge funds— Granite Corp.. Granite Partners Limited Partnership,

and Quartz Hedge Fund— managed by David Askin
billion, collapsed

due

to high leverage.'"

Askin

in

lost

New

York, with assets of $2

more than $570

million.'"

Askin had achieved good returns from his management of two Granite funds
(Granite Corp. and Granite Partners) in 1992: 21.8 percent in Granite Corp. and 21.15

percent in Granite Partners.'"^ After that, he established

acquired Granite Corp. and Granite Partners. "'"

strategy that

He wanted

made him

He

ACM

in

offered a "market-neutral" investment

Wall Street and Europe. "^^

attractive to sophisticated investors in

to get at least 15 percent

January 1993 and

annual return "'^according to one private placement

memorandum. '^^
However, he did not follow the strategy and appeared over-leveraged and
underhedged.'^'

He borrowed $2.50

per dollar that he invested in his funds

"''
See The President 's Working Group Report, supra note 16.
'" Saul Hansell, Investment Funds are Liquidated, N.Y. TIMES, April

Government

Securities Inc. accused four of failing to

totaling $6.6million, by the

Askin

funds.""

meet

Michael Siconolfi, Tumble

Lawsuit, Wall St. J., April 8, 1994, at CI.
'" Jack Willoughby, Askin Examiner Will Study Street

DIGEST
'^^

a series of

's

Role

1,

1994,

margin
in

at

Dl

;

'^"

"Lehman

calls after sharp losses,

Mortgage

Securities Sparks

INVESTMENT

in Collapse,

in order to

DEALERS-

8 (July 25, 1994).

Barry B. Burr, Firm Targets Mortgage Securities, PENSIONS

&

INVESTMENTS, 30 (Feb.

22, 1993).

'''Id
''''

'^'

Jaye Scholl,

How Did Askin

Really Collapse'

Barrons 20 (May

9, 1994).

See Barry B. Burr, supra note 164.
See Jack Willoughby, Askin Fund Assessor: Granite Appeared Unhedged, Over-Leveraged,

INVESTMENT DEALERS" DIGEST
'"'

Id
Hearings

8

(May

23, 1994).

Because of this failure, SEC
/, supra note 4 (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC)
and the President's Working Group on Financial Markets reviewed the structure and activity of hedge
funds and released a report, "An Assessment of Developments with Potential Implications for Market Price
Dynamics and Systemic Risk." Hearing!, supra note 17 (testimony of Richard R. Lindsey, Director, SEC).
;

.

.

.
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enhance the investments'

Because of increasing

million.'''^

on March

returns.'^'

He

leveraged approximately $2 billion with $600

interest rates, he cleared his funds

31, 1994.'^^ His funds' losses

were increased by the high

through "fire sales"

leverage.'^'*

After two brokerage firms, the funds' debtors, filed lawsuits on April

submitted "Chapter

1 1

bankruptcy."

'^^

7,

1994, he

In a six-week period, he had huge losses of 35%

($165 million of $470 million of capital).'^ His instrument was "risk-balanced mortgage-

backed securities which consisted of being long interest-only (lOs) and long principal1

77

only strips (POs),"

1

and he gained great

His funds' debacle came from an investment strategy which did not
interest rates,

satisfy

increasing

fit

and he was confronted with "the liquidity squeeze" because he could not

margin

calls for his leverage positions.

dropped within

fast a

In other words, because his funds' value

few months, he sold off fund holdings

Because of that, he could not recover his

calls.

78

profits for four years without fault.

losses.

at

He

a loss to satisfy margin

concealed the actual losses

of Granite Partners to his investors in February 1994 in order to escape redemption.'^'

Because of ACM's collapse, some investment banks which had financed
mortgage derivatives trades had severe

'^'

losses: for

his

example, the financial exposure of

Jaye Scholl, supra note 166. This news also handled investors' difficulties

instead of a trustee to investigate funds' history from April 1993 to

March

in

appointing an examiner

28, 1994; the U.S. Bankruptcy

compromise "between Askin and his investors on one
Wall Street firms." Jaye Scholl, Goldin Compromise, BARRON'S 14 (June 6, 1994).

court appointed Goldin as a trustee to

side,

and the

'''Id.
'^^

Saul Hansen, supra note 162; Brett D. Fromson, Hedge'

April
'"'''

'"'^

1,

Fund Falls

Victim to Downturn,

WASH. POST,

1994, at F8.

See Paul G. Barr, Firms Profit from Askin Fallout, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS 3 (May 2, 1994).
Saul Hansen, Facing Suits, Askin Funds Seek Chapter 11 Protection, N. Y. TIMES, April 8, 1994,

Philipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 50-51
'^^

Laura Jereski, Cracks Appear

'^^

Philipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 50-5

in

Granite Partners Fund,

WALL

ST.

J.,

1

'''Id.
'''Id.
'*°

Hearings

1,

supra note 4 (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC)

Mar. 30, 1994,

at

C

1

at

D2;
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Kidder, Peabody Group

Inc.'^"^ to

"symbiotic relationship" with

Wall Street's 'nuclear waste'"
that,

ACM was about $200 million.

ACM,

which means

some

to give

'^^

Securities firms had a

Askin was "a leading buyer of

that

benefits to securities firms, and because of

he received some help from the firms in inflating returns to his investors early in

The

1994.

creditors of the Granite Partners

Brothers, Donaldson Lufkin Jenrette,

Morgan

Salomon Brothers, Smith Barney, and

On May

Funds were Kidder Peabody, Lehman

UBS

23, 1995, Askin accepted

Stanley, Merill Lynch,

Securities.

SEC

Nomura

Securities,

'^^

charges of engaging in misleading and

fraudulent conduct to his investors, and agreed to a two-year suspension from securities
industry and a fine

,

which would be placed

in

escrow

to

compensate former

clients

of

ACM.^^^
2.

Problem
In the

ACM case, Askin promised investors that he would keep liquidity high and

portfolio leverage

low by buying only high-quality mortgage

thoroughly analyzed. However, he broke his promises.

'^'

See The actual

loss

was 2

1

securities that

had been

In addition, he concealed the

.89 percent in Feb. 1994, but he disclosed that the loss

was

1.5 percent that

month. See Laura Jereski, supra note 176.
'*^

"The biggest player in the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) area and the one with the largest
mortgage obligation (CMO) inventory." Elisa Herr, Revaluation of MBS Holdings Leaves Pain
and Opportunity, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST 15 (Apr. 25, 1994).
'^^
Michael Siconolfi, Kidder Discloses Scam in Bonds, Fires Top Trader
It Sets $350 Million Charge,
Says Scheme Involved Government-Strip Deals, WALL ST. J., April 18, 1994, at A3; Michael Siconolfi,
Kidder Had Major Exposure in Collapse of Askin, Jett Is Said to Have Told U.S. WALL ST. J., July 27,
1994, B2; Marion Merill Dow had $1 million loss and sued ACM that had allegedly mismanaged
collaterized

—

1

Marison's derivative contracts. Donna Rosato, Trading Losses Take

Toll,

B2,

USA TODAY, Apr.

28, 1994,

atB2.
'^^

Gary Weiss, The $700 Million Mystery, BUSINESS WEEK 76 (Dec. 18, 1995).
Jack Willoughby, supra note 163.
'^^
Kenneth N. Gilpin, Founder of Askin Capital Agrees to Settlement of SEC Charges, N. Y. TIMES, May
24, 1995, at D8; Laura Jereski, David Askin Settles SEC Proceedings Accusing Him of Fraudulent Conduct,
'^^

Wall
'*^

St.

J.,

May

24, 1995, at B5.

Jack Willoughby, Investors in Askin Funds Sue Street for $700 Mil, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST 3

(April

1,

1996).
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This case indicates the importance of transparency, risk

actual losses to investors.

management, and investor protection.

In particular,

high leverage was the main reason

for this debacle.

Argonaut Capital Management
1.

(ARCM)

Review

The value of ARCM
July of

1994.'**^

in

New

York went down 28 percent between January and

ARCM was managed by David Gerstenharber and Barry Bausano, former

managers of Tiger Management

(Tiger): Gerstenharber

was "an economist by

and Bausano was "an [executor] of Gerstenhaber's concepts"
returns:

45 percent

in 1991,

23 percent

in

ARCM raised an investment of
summer of 993
1

in

$400 million within just a few weeks

management

most hedeg funds), a 20 percent incentive

ARCM lost

invested, and investors

fee.

$110 million

in

fee

left

ARCM,

in the

(compared with a

1

percent

and a $5 million minimum
1994 from the

initial

withdrew approximately $225 million and

ARCM.'"- After Bausano

They made good

1992, and 61 percent in 1993.'""

despite having a 2 percent

investment.'"' But,

at Tiger."*"

training,"

Gerstenhaber managed

$400 million

left

$65 million

in

ARCM with $50 million'"'

(returning 31.5 percent gains to his U.S. investors and 65.1 percent gains to offshore

investors in 1996), and at

'^'^

last,

'"'^

'"'

'^-

Soros Fund Management.'"^

Fund Loses

Aug. 11, 1994, at A.
Stephen Taub, The Hedge Rows of Wall
Laura Jereski, supra note 189.

Its

Luster;

One Founder Resigns

as Losses Mount,

WALL

J.,

Id

;

Street,

Philipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 5 1-52

Fund Capital Shrinks
'"'

in

Philipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 51-52.

Laura Jereski, Argonaut Hedge
St.

he joined

after

Big Losses,

Caroline, Waxier, Oil's Well,

Wali

FORBES 202

;

FINANCIAL

WORLD

38 (Sept.

13, 1994).

Stephen Taub, supra note 190; Laura Jereski, Argonaut

Si.

J.,

Aug.

1

7,

(Feb. 10, 1997).

1

994,

at

C.

.
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2.

Problem
In this case, there

management because

was no breach

ot contract, but

we can

see the importance of risk

ARCM had huge losses within a short period.

Vairocana Ltd.

1.

Review
David de Jongh

accounts

in

London."*'

Weill'"'

managed Vajra Fund, Dorje Fund, and some managed

He managed

these funds excellently for

records, averaging 36 percent annual gains.

billion in 1993.

1992."'

'"^

si.x

years with good

was managing

In particular, while he

$1

.2

he returned 63 percent profit to investors compared to about 55 percent

The funds'

assets

grew

to

$75

billion at the

end of 1993, compared

to

in

$200

million at the end of 1992.""

He and

his wife,

an ex-options trader, managed the fund with his eight

original strategy of investment

was

staff.-""

His

"interest rate neutral yield-curve arbitrage strategies

with European bonds."'"' He, however, changed investment strategy without giving
notice to his investors and had stated betting on European interest rates with a

1

to

1

Robert Bonte-Friedheim and Laura Jereski, Hedge-Fund Group of George Soros Hires Gerstenhaher,
Si. J., Oct. 2, 1997, B 9.

Wall
'

1

He was bom

in

Atlanta and

conqueror," and Dorje

is

is

an ardent Buddhist and 36 years old. Vairocana

"thunderbolt"

in

is

Sanskrit for "the great

Tibetan. While he studied at the University of Georgia, he also

learned "volatile interest- rate futures on an almost -daily basis" on an account at Merrill Lynch. Laura

—

The Wrong Stuff: Good Connections Put Hedge Fund in Business But a Bad Bet Sank It
Manager David Weill, Suave and Impressive, Drew in Europe 's Wealthy Class
Adieu to a Gilded World.

Jereski,

—

Wall
'"^
'

""*

St.

J.,

Sept. 28,

1

994,

at

A

Philipp Cottier, supra note 22,

Laura Jereski,

5;//7A-a

I

at

52

note 195.

Id

'''Id
""'

Philipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 52.
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leverage.-"- Initially, he achieved large gains

months

through huge leverage, but over a few

1994. he lost $700 million from his

in

seven months, he

lost

60 percent of the

initial

initial

investment of $1

investment (he

lost

.2

bilhon.

a

i.e.. in

20 percent just

in

August).-"'

His investors could not receive a correct Net Asset Value
investment position was too complex to calculate

(NAV)

it.-"^His investors

because his

withdrew

their

investments from the fund; thus, he disposed of all remaining positions and cleared the

two

funds.-"'

1994

that he

found a

1

He
had

also concealed his losses

lost 3

his investors: he reported

percent for the month. -"^ However, a few days

7 percent decline during

the basis of on the valuation of

2.

from

May. Furthermore, he charged

on

May

later, the

his year-end

27,

auditor

bonus on

March 31,1 994.-"^

Problem
This case indicates the risk of high leverage in the financial market. In addition,

there

was

a lack of disclosure to investors.

Fenchurch Capital Management (FCM)
1.

-"^

Review

FCM,

a subsidiary of United

Kingdom investment bank Kleinwort Benson and

commodity-trading adviser and investment-fund operator, was organized in Chicago
1985.-"''

The Fenchurch

Gamma fund (Gamma fund),

exchange, gained 23 percent annual returns

-"; Id.
^"^
-"''

Id;

Laura Jereski. supra note

1

95.

Philipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 52.

'-''

Id.
^"^

Laura

2"'

Id

Jereski,

supra note 195.

in

a

in

a listing fund on the Dublin stock

1985 and for a five-year period continued

.
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Marcus A. Hutchins, a president and chief trader of

to be the highest-performing.

FCM,

returned 17 percent profits to his investors for 1992 with $111 million under

management.
In 1994,

FCM managed $650 million with leverages of up to approximately $30

billion in arbitrage positions

and earned

1

months of 1 994 with

5 percent in the first eight

Investors were insurance

"relative value trades" in the fixed-income instruments.

companies, non-U.S. banks, pension funds, wealthy individuals, and fund of funds
managers.

At

213

the beginning of 1995,

FCM managed $700 million in the Gamma fund and in

Fenchurch Beta Fund Limited Partnership (Beta fund), having increased from $350
million in 1994 and $150 million in 1993.

American hedge funds

On June
percent in

May.

1,

fi-om

1992

'

Thus,

FCM was one of the fastest-growing

to 1994.^'^

1995, Marcus Hutchins reported to investors that

FCM fell

FCM dropped about seven percent in one day of September

declined 22 percent within that month, and was

Gamma fund and Beta fund declined 41

^°^

Philipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 52-53.

^°^

Miriam Bensman,

Psst,

down dunng

percent between

1

1.5

1995,

nine months in 1995.

March and November 1995

We're Market-Neutral, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 37

7 7
1

(Jan. 1995).

'''Id.

^" Ginger Szala, Fenchurch Spreads
Profits as Other Managers Retrench,
^'^

Defying the Odds, FORTUNE 84 (Oct.
'''Id
^'''

Andrew

17, 1994);

FUTURES 58

(July 1992).

Miriam Bensman, supra note 209.

Bary, Trading Points: Floating Like a Butterfly,

Fund Gets Stung By a

Bee,

BARRON'S

MW12

(June 26, 1995).

'''Id

"^ Robert Bonte-Friedheim and Michael R. Robert, Fenchurch 's
Highflying Chief Crashes as Its GlobalBond Funds Take a Dive, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1995, at A; Michael R. Sesit, Despite '95 Rally in Global

Bond Markets, Many Traders Aren
^'^

't

Reaping Rewards,

Philipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 52.

WALL

ST.

J.,

Nov. 13,1 995,

at

C

1
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because they had huge losses in "a German yield-curve trade and a German-French
interest-rate arbitrage."

FCM lost $1,264 million within eight months of that year.
pulled out their money, the total assets of
-)

1

mvestors.

2.

FCM decreased from $1,403

billion to

$139

"770

Q

and dropped

million within eight months'"

particular, the

Because investors

manager of the fund changed

to only

the

about $75million in 1996.

hedge

fiind strategy

In

without notifying the

221

Problem
In this case, there were several problems: high leverage, lack of disclosure, and

lack of investor protection.

Comments
Table 2 shows

common problems of hedge

funds such as lack of disclosure, high

leverage, and change of investment strategy without notice.

MIF made phony

account statements, and

losses to their investors.

Those

investors.

protection.

means

that

^'*

FCM did not disclose its change in investment strategy to its

ACM, Vairocana,

even

if

and

losses in

After

and

in investor

hedge funds occurred quickly over a few months. This

Some Good

Philipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 52-53.

^^°

Andrew
Id

in disclosure

FCM used high leverage, which amplified their losses.

^'^

^^'

problem

a hedge fund was returning good profits,

Andrew Bary, Trading Points:
BARRON'S MW12 (Oct.2, 1995).

15, 1996).

to disclosure,

ACM and Vairocana both concealed the real

facts indicated that there is

On the other hand, huge

With respect

Years,

it

could suffer a huge loss

Euro Bond Market Batters Some Big Investors,

Bary, Trading Points: Fenchurch Affair: Trouble for the

Repo Market? BARRON'S

MWl

1

(July

36

within short period of time. In short, compounding the problem, there were disclosure

problems

for investors,

and the funds were too highly leveraged.

Table 2: Hedge funds 'fraud and debacles

ACM

ARCM

David Askin

Gerstenharb

New York

New York

$300M
Made phony

$570M

Concealed

Did not

account

the actual

the actual

disclose

statements

losses

losses

strategy

MIF
Principals

Michael W.

Main

Berger
Office

Losses
Disclosure

(M: Million)

Marcus A.

New York

London

Chicago

$110M

$700M

$1,264M

er

Concealed

FCM

Vairocana
David de
Jongh Weill

/

Bausano

-

Hutchins

change
Leverage

-

High

-

leverage

Investment
strategy

-

Market-

High

leverage

leverage

Interest-rate

neutral

neutral yield

Did not

curve

follow the
strategy
Source: data from the

-

High

summary of this

chapter.

-

CHAPTER VII
LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT EPISODE
Review
Establishment

LTCM was started with $1.01

billion capital in

February 1994 by former Salomon

Brothers' vice president John Meriweather and other partners, including

winners,

Myron

two Nobel prize

Sholes and Robert Merton, and U.S. Federal Reserve former vice999

chairman David Mullins.

In particular,

it

was managed by 25

"Delaware limited partnership" whose main office was located

However, the name "Long-Term" which
trading"^^^ does not

match the

characteristics

99^

Ph.D.s.

LTCM was a

in Connecticut.

translates into "patience" or "patiently

of hedge funds because they usually take

"short-term investment strategies."
Structure and

Development

LTCM was one of the biggest hedge funds

in the

world

of talent in pricing and trading financial instruments" and

^^^

Nicholas Dunbar, INVESTING

Legends Behind
Merrill

Lynch

17 (Oct.

1,

997

due to

"its

assemblage

"its large initial capital

MONEY- THE STORY LONG-TERM Capital Management and The
David Mullins joined in summer and was not partner at the outset.

It xi-xii (2000);

& Co., Long-Term Capital,

LP., Private Placement of Limited Partnership Interests,

1,

16-

1993).

How the Salesmanship and Brainpower Failed at Long -

Term
Nov. 16, 1998, at Al.
^"''
(1) Fund was a newly formed Delaware Limited Partnership. (2) Portfolio com. was a newly formed
Delaware Limited Liability Company. (3) Long-Term Capital Mangement Inc. was a Delaware
Corporation. Merrill Lynch & Co., supra note 222, at 1, 3; In the Report of The President's Working Group
on Financial markets, Long-Term Capital Portfolio L.P. was a Cayman Islands partnership. But see The
President's Working Group Report, supra note 16 But see Nicholas Dunbar, supra note 217, at 126.
-^'
Living large, GRANT'S INTEREST RATE OBSERVER (Nov. 5, 1993).

""^Michael Siconolfi
Capital,

Wall

ST.

et al.,

All Bets are

off:

J.,

;

<http://wysiwyg://4/http://www. grantspub.com/dispatch/000 1 .html>

37

38

stake.

"'^^^

through

its

It

raised

its

capital with "a private offering

placement agent, Merrill Lynch

& Co.

of limited partnership interests"
Figure

1

shows

the structure of

i

LTCM.
Figure

1:

LTCM Structure

Long-Term Capital
Management L.P. (LTCM)
-

General Partner of Fund
Investment Manager of
Portfolio

Source: data from Merrill Lynch
Partnership Interests,

Its

1

(Oct.

1,

& Co.,

Com.

Long-Term

Capital, L.P., Private Placement of Limited

1993).

investment strategy was to get gains from "discrepancies in the relative value

of government bonds, fixed-income derivatives, equities and equity derivatives primarily
in the U.S., Japanese,

^*

228

229

230

230

Working Group Report, supra note 16, at Appendix A; LTCM was the
1996. Beverly Chandler, supra note 2, at 126.
See Philipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 26, Table 2-4.
Hearings /, supra note 4 (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, FED).
See Merrill Lynch & Co., supra note 222.
Outlook Dec. 1998. supra note 18, at III, 54, Box 3.4.
77?^ President's

funds by asset size
227

and European markets."

in

largest

hedge

.

39

Table 3 shows that

LTCM was a unique hedge fund in the industry:

three-year redemption restriction; (2)

(3)

it

its

high

minimum

(1 )

it

had a

investment was $10 million; and

had a 2 percent annual management fee on the assets basis and a 25 percent

performance fee on the profits

basis.

Table 3: Comparison between

LTCM, Common Hedge funds, and Mutual Funds

LTCM

Common Hedge

Mutual Funds

Funds

Minimum

$10 million

$5 million

$1,000 or

Administrative :2%

Administrative: 1-1

Administrative: 1 .24

5%

%

less

investment

Fees

Incentive:
Restriction

on

25%

Incentive: 15-25%

Three years

Quarterly or Yearly

Daily

redemption
Source: data from summary.

LTCM wanted to "[suck]
addition, Scholes

up nickels from

answered with pride

over the world" but

all

to a question

"[a]s long as there continue to be people like you,

from a potential

[it

will]

failed.

In

LTCM investor that

make money."

Near Bankruptcy

LTCM returned about $2.7 billion to

its

investors at the end of 1997,

capital $ 4.8 billion, but did not reduce its leverage size.^^"^

billion in balance sheet positions.

231

232

Its

leverage ratio

supra note 223; Merrill Lynch

Michael Siconolfi

et al.,

Michael Siconolfi

et al., Id.

made

its

LTCM managed about $120

was 25-times

its

capital

but later

& Co., supra note 222, at 2, 4-5.

233

Id.

The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16, at Appendix A.
"^ Outlook Dec. 1998, supra note 1
8, at III, 54, Box 3.4; But see Meriwether insisted that
leverage

was not excessive." Nicholas Dunbar, supra note 222,

at

226.

"LTCM's

40

became 100 times
about $1.25

losses

Meriwether's

due to

1,000 times

trillion-

Huge

capital

its

its

LTCM's

was

were incurred during August and September 1998.

letter to his investors

$4.1 billion

on August

leverage ratio became 50 times
$1.5billion and at last

fell

on September 23,

capital)

LTCM had "a notional value" of

capital-in derivatives positions.

on September

losses.^^^ In particular, the $2.1 billion losses

capital

236

decline.

to

1,

$600 million

1998,

LTCM

happened only

1998 and $2.3
"*'

its capital).

1998.^'*^

2,

billion

According

had $2.5 billion

August.

in

'^^

by September

After 16 days,

(the leverage ratio

its

capital

to

in

LTCM's
1,

1998 (the

'

dropped to

became 167 times

its

LTCM lost 90 percent of its equity within only 55

days.^^^

These enormous losses could possibly have disrupted or weakened the
international financial market,

i.e.,

the

meltdown of LTCM could have caused "a global

systemic crisis that could [have harmed] financial institutions and investors worldwide,

given the size and extent of

[its] positions."'^'*^

solve the problem even though

'^^

ABA

this reason,

LTCM was a private

Brooksley Bom, Regulatory Responses to Risks

Regulation of Securities

For

Section of Business

in the

Law

FRBNY intervened to
'^

limited partnership.

OTC Derivatives Market, Comm.

(Nov.

13,

on Federal

1998)

<http://www.cftc.gov/opayspeeches/bom-40.htm>
'''Id.
^'^

Hearings

David

2,

supra note 17 (testimony of Richard R. Lindsey, Director, SEC).
Lessons From the Collapse of Hedge Fund, Long-Term Capital Management (IFCI).

Shirreff,

<http://wwrw.risk;.ifci.ch/146520.html>
'''Id.
^'"

Steve Mufson, Fund's Big Betters Learned That Risk Trumps Math, History,

1998, at HOI; Outlook Dec. 1998, supra note 18, at
^"•^

Steve Mufson,

Id;

Outlook Dec. 1998 Id

'""'

Steve Mufson,

Id\

Outlook Dec. 1998

'^ See Hearings

3,

III,

55,

111,

54,

Box

Thomas A. Russo and Marlisa Vinciguerra,
Vinci§
Regulation
Futures
Y
& Derivatives L. Rep. (Feb. 1999).

One

Cottier,

general partner has unlimited
unlin

supra note 22,

at 56, 60.

Sept. 27,

Bom,

Chairperson, CFTC); See Outlook Dec.

in the

Wake of Long-Term

3.4.

'^^

'"^^

WASH. POST,

3.4.

Id.

supra note 10 (testimony of Brooksley

1998, supra note 18, at

Box

liability,

Capital's Rescue,

and multiple limited partners have limited

liability. Phillipp

K

I
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Rescue Plan

On September 28,

1998, a $3.6 billion bailout package of

LTCM

was planned by

a consortium of fourteen major international financial institutions including global

commercial and investment banks which were
investors.

^'*''

The rescue package was

stakes of $300 million in

(3)

one

(2)

counterparties, creditors, and

as follows: (1) eleven institutions^"^*^ took equity

two

institutions^"*^

took stakes of $125 million; and

took a stake of $ 1 00 million. Furthermore, Union Bank of

institution

Switzerland (UBS) wrote

Through a bailout

LTCM;

LTCM's

down

its

original equity stake in

plan, the consortium

owned 90

LTCM of $685

percent equity in

million.'^^'

LTCM.

After the bailout of LTCM, those institutions had a hard time. In October 1998,
the stock price of Merrill

jQ^g

233

QqIj^j^^j^

Lynch

75 percent, compared to the beginning price of

fell

Sachs postponed

its IPO.'^^'*

declined 60 percent, and, as a result, the

In

closed.^^^

"

They

December 1 999,

are creditors of

LTCM, and some
Bom,

suffered from bankruptcy rumors.

still

have

of them are

losses.^^'

LTCM's swaps

counterparties. Hearings 2, supra

Chairperson, CFTC).

Banker's Trust, Barclays, Chase Manhattan, Credit Suisse, First Boston, Deutsche Bank,

Goldman

Morgan Stanley Dean
Generale and Lehman Brothers.

Sachs, Merrill Lynch,

'^^

Societe

"''

Paribas

^^^Outlook Dec. 1998, supra note 18, at

III,

54,

Box

Witter, Travelers,

J.P. Morgan,
and Union Bank of Switzerland.

3.4.

supra note 4 (testimony of Richard R. Lindsey, Director, SEC)
Nicholas Dunbar, supra note 222, at 225.

Hearings

^^^

company

price of Lehman Brothers

LTCM repaid its consortium members, LTCM was

However, some investors

note 17 (testimony of Brooksley
^'*^

after

The stock

/,

'''Id.
'''Id.

"^

Trillion Dollar Bet,

PBS TV(Feb

8.

2000) [hereinafter Trillion Dollar Bet].

<http://www.pbs.org/wgbhynovaytranscripts>

'''Id
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The

The

Failure of Economic Genius

LTCM episode indicated again the failure case of "economic genius" in the
which means there were gaps between the academic

financial world,

field

and the

real

business field.

The

LTCM episode is not the first time that economic genius has tripped

American economist, managed
and
is said to have lost much of it
Yale's endowment
in the crash of 1929. In the early 1920s, John Maynard Keynes lost his wealth
speculating in foreign exchange, and was saved from bankruptcy by family
'^^
and friends.

over market

reality. Irving Fisher, the great

portfolio in the 1920s

The

UBS,

UBS

and

LTCM was as follows:

sold "the right to the managers of

shares" in

LTCM^^';

(3) in order to

million;

and

Due

hedge

(2) the seven-year

its

position,

(4) additionally,

to the

good

^^*

UBS

buy

call

UBS bought shares

UBS

fi-om

risk

UBS

transaction

and October 1997,

a fixed

number of

option could be operated in 2004;

in

LTCM to the value of $800

invested $266 million in

UBS

The

(1) in June, August,

to

European

LTCM.

LTCM.^^^

managers never considered the

LTCM which would have left them with a large degree of

Because of this

Throughout 1997,

[LTCM]

returns of LTCM,

possibility of a collapse of

exposure.

Fiasco

the biggest loser, wrote off $685 million in

system between

UBS

UBS

failure, the

chairman of UBS Board of Directors resigned.

discussed with the partners of

LTCM a structured transaction

See George H. Borts, Building a Better Hedge Fund (Brown University Faculty Governance).

<http://facgov.brown.edu/facgov/facbulletin/March99Issue/borts.html>
'''Id.
^^°

David

^^'

UBS, The LTCM Dealing (UBS news) <http:// www.ubs.com/e/index.htm>; David Shirreff, Id.
UBS, Id; David Shirreff, Id; Scholes devised this transaction. Michael Siconolfi et al., supra note 223.

'^'
^*^

Shirreff,

See David

supra note 239.

Shirreff,

supra note 239.

',•

'1.
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together with an investment in the shares of the fund.

acquiring a stake in

UBS

had been interested

in

LTCM.

LTCM was seen by the investment community as a successful
fund which had consistently produced outstanding returns for

its

and well managed

investors.

UBS

and

LTCM agreed to enter into a series of transactions on the understanding that a proprietary
investment in the fund could be
transaction. Investors in

fiind.

investments. In sum,

time was

restrictions

were imposed by the managers on the hedged

made UBS' investment extremely

Losses by the fund

left

UBS

sensitive to a drop in the value of the

Chief Executive Officer confessed

this structure justifiable

from a

more

carefully, the

UBS

unit.^^^ After that, the

SFBC

ordered

After the

disclosed the huge losses.

If

UBS

to

LTCM was

SFBC

had

huge losses of UBS would have been reduced or escaped.

^^ Nicholas Dunbar, supra note 222, at 226.
Hearing /, supra note 4 (written testimony of Henry
""'Id.

no

Commission (SFBC) examined

"take organizational actions with respect to internal controls."

already near-bankruptcy, however,

in a disclosure that " [a]t

risk/return perspective."

Global Equity Derivatives Business

investigated

.,.

UBS with a significant writedown in its LTCM

In particular, Switzerland's Federal Banking

UBS'

restrictions to the overall

LTCM were required to commit to an initial investment period

of three years. Additionally,
shares. This

made by UBS. There were two

T. C.

Hu, Professor of Law, University of Texas).
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Other Losers

Due

to

LTCM's

counterparties. Table 4

University

near bankruptcy,

shows other

Endowment Fund and

its

losers

investors also had losses like

and

its

their losses. In particular, St. Jones

University of Pittsburgh invested in the

LTCM.

Table 4: Investors and losses

Name

(M: Million)

Amount(USD)
30

Bank of Italy

lOOM

Credit Suisse

55M
685M
22M

UBS
Merrill

Lynch

Donal Marron

Sandy Weill
Mckinsey executives
Bear Stems executives

lOM
lOM
lOM

Sumitomo Bank
Prudential Life Corp.

5.43M

Bank

Julius

Baer

N.R.(Not Reported)

Republic National Bank

N.R.

Johns University

N.R.

St.

Employees' deferred
payment

Chairman of Paine Webber

Co-CEO

Citicorp

20M
145M
lOOM

Dresdner Bank

Notes

M

Liechtenstein Global Trust

Clients' investment

Endowment Fund
University of Pittsburgh

LTCM partners

N.R.

1,100M

1

,500M

at the

beginning of

1998, offset by their

$400M

stake in the rescued fund
Source

:

The

International Finance and

Commodities

Institute <http://www.risk.ific.ch/146520.html>

1
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Problems

Unsound

Practices

Lending
faulty in the

risk

institutions' credit risk

LTCM case.

Those lending

of their loan to hedge funds.

financial markets.

management and

their decision malcing

institutions'"

were

should have been aware of the

LTCM partners consisted of famous experts in the

Because of its partners' reputation,
77

hedge fund through excessive leverage:

many

it

became an unusually

large

international institutions willingly lent to

LTCM.^^^

On the other hand,
funds. If hedge fiinds

risk.^^^ In the

power

^^*

in the

institutions usually

fail to

have derivatives contracts with hedge

perform the contracts, institutions face a counterparty

LTCM debacle, that problem arose. LTCM often used unlimited borrowing

OTC

"Good judgment"
FRBNY).

derivatives market, borrowing as

is

one issue

in

LTCM. Hearings

3,

much

as 1,300 times

its capital.^^"^

supra note 10 (statement of William

J.

Mcdough,

President,
^^^

The examples of banking

services to hedge funds are as follows: (1) Direct lending, secured and

unsecured; (2) Lines of credit for foreign exchange, derivatives, fixed income securities, precious metals,
and emerging markets trading; (3) Lines of credit for government securities repurchase agreements; (4)

of credit; (5) Payment services for foreign exchange trading; (6) Custodial services; (7)
and clearing of trades; and (9) cash management
services. Franklin R. Edwards, supra note 21, at 190-91; Hearings 2, supra note 17 (testimony of Julie L.

Standby

letters

Securities clearance; (8) Brokerage services for execution

Williams, Acting Comptroller, OCC).

"° "Creditors' normal risk management standards were compromised" as a result of "placing too much
.." Hearings 3, supra note 10 (testimony of Leon
reliance on assumed financial strength and reputation
.

M. Metzger).
^^'
LTCM was very

a unique

.

hedge fund because of great leverage and

capital.

Hearings

3,

supra note 10

(testimony of Leon M. Metzger).
^^^

See Hearings

2,

supra note 17 (statement of William

Julie L. Williams, Acting Comptroller,
^^^

J.

Mcdough,

President,

FRBNY),

(testimony of

OCC).

2, supra note 7 (statement of Donna Tanoue, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance
Chase Manhattan Corp. disclosed $3.2 billion of its total loan portfolio which is exposed to hedge
funds. Fed Chief Defends Bailout, CNN FN, Oct. 1, 1998.
274
QYjQ chairperson compared this unlimited borrowing in the OTC derivatives market to the unlimited
borrowing on securities that contributed to the Great Depression. Hearings 2, supra note 17 (testimony of
Brooksley Bom, Chairperson, CFTC).

See Hearings

Corp.)

;

1

J'

:[

)'

'.

f 2

1
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Co-chairman of Citigroup

Inc. recalled that the

LTCM "never wanted to discuss

what the whole picture was," and Merrill Lynch chairman said
that part

of the portfolio that

we

that " [w]e really only

saw

did business with."

CFTC's Mistakes
The regulation system was

was

LTCM episode. LTCM's structure

also a limited partnership because of exemption

However,

was

it

registered with the

and reported large investment
reported

its

CFTC

as a

in U.S. Futures

financial statements to the

oversight by

from the regulation of the SEC.

CPO, was

a

member of NFA,

Exchanges. In addition, as a CPO,

CFTC, namely,

LTCM

LTCM was only subject to

CFTC.

Even though
the

deficient in the

CFTC was

the regulation of hedge funds

able to examine

LTCM's

was

insufficient as the

financial statements.

CFTC

However, the

stated,

CFTC

received the news of LTCM's near-bankruptcy from the Department of Treasury,

CFTC

indicating that

did ignore the financial condition of

leverage ratio of hedge funds

The

is

two

LTCM even though the normal

to one.

financial statements of LTCM's largest fund (in

funds invest) showed

total assets

of about $129

which the other

billion, total capital

of about $4.67 billion and net income from operations of about

showed that the fund held swap
agreements with a notional value of about $697 billion and U.S. and
foreign exchange-traded futures with a notional value of about $47
$1.4billion. Footnotes to the statements

billion.

Nothing

in the financial statements indicated

reason for concern

LTCM's largest fund had 1997
30% of its year-end capital, and its

about the funds' financial condition.

income from operations of about

^^^
Michael Siconolfi et al., supra note 223.
"^ There are no reporting requirements concerning OTC derivatives positions. Hearings 3, supra note 10
(testimony of Brooksley Bom, Chairperson, CFTC).
^^^
But see CFTC chairperson said that the annual financial reports filed with CFTC do not fully reveal off-

balance sheet transactions' positions. Thus,
disclosure and price transparency in the

Brooksley

Bom,

"* Hearings

3,

CFTC

OTC

suggested the need for reporting, recordkeeping,

derivatives market. Hearings 2, supra note

Chairperson, CFTC).

supra note 10 (testimony of Leon M. Metzger).

1

7 (testimony of

47

asset to capital ratio

was about 28

to one.

During 1995 and 1996,

its

annual rate of return on capital had exceeded 40%, and the amount

of its leverage had been approximately the same. The fund was well
capitalized and very profitable. Its asset to capital ratio was similar to

some other hedge funds as well as many major investment banks
and commercial banks.
that

After the near-bankruptcy of LTCM,

CFTC recommended that "the need

for

increased transparency, the need to eliminate excessive leverage, the need for better
prudential controls, and the need for enhanced international cooperation and

harmonization of regulations" are necessary in hedge funds.

CFTC

used unsound practices without examination, and

CFTC

and solve the problems

in order not to

we

In

my

view, however,

should note the mistakes of

make same mistakes

in the future.

Risk Management
Similar to other hedge funds cases,

LTCM had enormous losses during August

and September 1998. Thus, the risk management of LTCM
protection were problematic.

itself

and investors'

Even though Merton and Scholes had pioneered

the theory

of options pricing, they did not succeed in risk management.
Transparency and Disclosure

Transparency and disclosure are issues in the

LTCM episode.

LTCM had a good reputation due to high returns: 20 percent in
41 percent in 1996, and 17 percent in 1997.

At the

first stage,

1994, 43 percent in 1995,

Because the hedge fund's average

Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 105* Cong. (1998)
Bom, Chairperson, CFTC). <http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speches/bom-41.htm>
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Risk Management and Specialty Crops of the House Comm. on
Agriculture, 106* Cong.(1999) (testimony of Brooksley Bom, Chairperson, CFTC).
(testimony of Brooksley

<http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches/bom-49.htm>
^*'

Outlook Dec. 1998, supra note

1

8, at III,

54 Box 3.4

.
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performance was 16 percent in 1995 and 17 percent

in 1996,

LTCM's

returns

were

excellent.

LTCM was highly leveraged, but many
because of its high returns and partners' fame.

and

to its investors,

was famous

it

for example, institutional investors

institutional investors invested in

Its portfolio,

late.

Because the

failure

international market,

the

however, was not disclosed

for "the paucity of information distributed."

and individuals did not receive

the hedge fund. They, therefore, were unable to act until

too

LTCM

full

LTCM failed

Thus,

information about

-

by then,

it

was

of LTCM could have had severe consequences for the

FRBNY intervened in the LTCM bailout plan.

hedge funds should be regulated

in order to

make hedge funds transparent

In

my

view,

in the financial

market.

No

Sharing of Information

Even though
level

of debt, the

the

CFTC

CFTC

282
283
284

the Federal Regulators

had the financial information about

LTCM and knew the

did not act on the information or share any information with

other federal regulators.^^^

indicated that the

among

The document

LTCM filed with the CFTC in mid-March

LTCM had borrowed total $125 billion on $4.7 billion capital ($25

1998
per

et al., supra note 223; Trillion Dollar Bet, supra note 256.
and Philip A. Wellons, supra note 14, at 1069.

Michael Siconolfi

See Hal

S. Scott

1

LTCM: One Bad Apple"?

[hereinafter

One Bad Apple]

0psnov/nov98PS 1 4.html>
^*'
See Outlook Dec. 1998, supra note 18, at
Greenspan, Chairman, FED); See Hearings

<http://www.assetpub.com/archives/ps/9-

1

54 Box 3.4; Hearings 2, supra note 17 (statement of Alan
supra note 10 (testimony of Lewis A. Sachs, Deputy

III,

3,

Assistant Secretary, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury); Barry Eichengreen and Donald Mathieson, supra note
48. The

Dow Jones

Industrial

Average was down 283 points by noon. Michael Siconolfi

et al.,

supra note

223.

See Kathleen Day, Top Regulator Was Aware of Fund's Debt; CFTC's Born Failed to Act on LongTerm Capital Data, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1998, at CI 1
1
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$1 of its equity capital) and had huge derivatives exposure, $1.3 trillion as of Dec. 31,

J

997

287

The
President's

CFTC

could easily have shared

LTCM's

information

Working Group on Financial Markets, where

SEC, FED, and Treasury meet every two weeks

staff

a meeting of the

at

members from

the

CFTC,

to share "information about the markets,

the major players in those markets, and any potential problems that might be emerging in

But

the markets."

CFTC

CFTC

did not share

explained that Section 8 (e) of the

LTCM's

information with other regulators.

CEA prevents CFTC

from sharing information

with other federal regulators in any time unless other regulators ask for the
information.

Furthermore, the

financial information,

In

my judgment,

its

CFTC

did not inform the other regulators of LTCM's

debt level, until several days after

the "perpetual conflict" between

its

bailout

SEC and CFTC

is

by a consortium.'^^^

the one of reasons

for that situation.

Too-Big-To-Fail Doctrine
In

LTCM's

case, the too-big-to fail doctrine,

abused by banks and

and

its

S&Ls

in the 1980's,

impact was so great,

reputation and performance,

it

was

which was abandoned

applied.

was secured by government

Because

after

it

was

LTCM was so big,

intervention.

Due

to its

LTCM was able to use excessive leverage, borrow money,

and have many transactions with international major banks and securities firms. With

its

'''Id.

'yd.
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Securities and Government Sponsored Enterprises of
House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 106 Cong. (1999) (testimony of Brooksley Bom,
Chairperson, CFTC). <http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches/bom-43.htm>
^^°
See Kathleen Day, supra note 286.
See Thomas A. Russo and Marlisa Vinciguerra, supra note 245.
the

'
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partners' reputations

and

its

high returns,

securities firms in the financial market.

LTCM had huge transaction with banks and

The

effects outside

hedge funds,

were very

thus,

huge.

LTCM had $

1.3 trillion

OTC

derivatives position as of Dec. 31, 1997, had about

72 conterparties on repo and reverse repo transaction and approximately 50
counterparties on

was

OTC

LTCM's

also a clearing firm for

was a

Bear Stems,

derivative transactions.

prime broker,

U.S. exchange-traded futures and Merrill Lynch

clearing firm for non-U. S. exchange-traded futures. If the international financial

community had not rescued

it,

the effect

on the

financial market

there are possibilities of domino effect liquidation

market. The

among

would have been

severe:

counterparties in the financial

LTCM bailout plan came form that background.

However, with the
lot

LTCM's

too-big-to-fail doctrine, every

hedge fund may want

of leverage and borrow more money in order to be safe

at

doctrine. Therefore, this standard goes against the principle

any

difficult

to

have a

time with that

of capitalism, and

it

should

not be applied in the financial market again.

A Double Standard
When

Asian countries went through economic

crises, the

IMF and

the U.S.

regulators requested that the indebted companies be closed and that they sell their assets

to creditor

^'^

s.'^^'*

See Hearing

1,

However, the U.S. regulators handled the case of LTCM

differently.

supra note 4 (written testimony of Henry T. C. Hu, Professor of Law, University of

Rashomon in Connecticut What Really Happened to Long-Term Capital
Management? Slate (Oct. 1, 1998). <http://slate.msn.com/Dismal/98-10-01/Dismal.asp>
^^^
The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16.
Texas); See Paul Krugman,

^^*

The

Ellen Frank, Double dealing,

NEW

INTERNATIONALIST

<http://oneworld.org/ni/issue3 1 2/dealing.htm>

(

May

1999).
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LTCM rescue revealed the inequality of a system in which there is only one standard;^^^
"whether

Korea, Thailand, Connecticut

in

[in

LTCM],

or Brazil, U.S.- and

IMF

-

organized bailouts conform to the same guiding principle: whatever happens, whoever

at fault, the

The

wealth of Western creditors must be protected and enhanced."

Failure of Regulators' Prediction

During the April

13,

1994 hearing, regulators discussed the leverage and impact

of hedge funds. The main concerns of the hearing were "(1) does lending

to the funds put

insured depository institutions at risk? and (2) do their speculative trading strategies

markets more volatile and less stable than they would be otherwise?"

707

make

However,

regulators failed to regulate the leverage because they thought the potential problem

would not happen. Five years

The

later, the

LTCM near-bankruptcy occurred.

LTCM debacle case indicated that one hedge fimd "could have potentially

impaired the economies of many nations, including [America.]"
there

^^^

is

was a

Mark

failure

Jickling,

Hearings

1,

of regulators' prediction.

supra note

5, at 5.

supra note 4 (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman,

FED)

Table 5 shows that
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Table 5: The Difference of Regulators opinions (between 1994 and 1999)

House Hearing( April

The

994)

1

President's

Working Group

on Financial Markets(April 1999)

Does lending
hedge

to

Consensus of banking regulators
present at hearing

was

-Excessive leverage increases
likelihood of break

that

down

in

funds put

lending to hedge funds does not

functioning of financial markets

insured

pose significant risk to banks as

-The near-collapse of LTCM

depository

such loans were generally well-

illustrates

institutions at

collaterized

and very small

need for

in financial

constraints

risk?

all

participants

system to face

on amount of leverage

assumed

Do hedge

Witnesses agreed that hedge

-Concerns expressed about

funds'

funds were not unique in their

activities

speculative

trading practices, but were only

institutions with respect to

trading

one among many groups of

impact on market dynamics

strategies

institutional investors active in

vulnerable economies

make

markets

-Activities of hedge funds can

-Witnesses also stressed that the

affect markets in

amount of capital managed by

circumstances and for limited

hedge funds is "modest" in
comparison to the total turnover

periods although the activities of

than they

would be

in global currency

otherwise?

markets

markets more
volatile

and

less stable

and

securities

some

highly leveraged institutions have
not played a significant role in
precipitating financial market
crises

Participants

of highly leveraged

-FED, SEC, CFTC,

OCC

of past few years

-Department of the Treasury,

FED, SEC, CFTC
The President's Working Group on Financial Markets (Apr.
Hedge Funds, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 5 (June 21,

Source: data from House Hearing (Apr. 1994),

1999),and

Mark

Jickling,

1994).

Leverage
Leverage

is

not always bad in the financial market. In particular,

functions: (1) "it creates and enhances the risk of default

it

has two

by market participants"; and

(2)

"rapid deleveraging can cause major disruptions in the financial market by exaggerating

market movements."^^^ In

299

particular,

Outlook Dec. 1998, supra note

1

8, at III, 5

LTCM described leverage in its prospectus: "the

1

,

Box

3.3.

53

Company

Portfolio

fluctuate depending

will typically

be very highly leveraged, and such leverage will

on market conditions."

°

Research about leverage of hedge fiinds showed that their leverage degree
proper.^°'

The

results

of that research were as follows:

first,

is

about 30 percent of all hedge

funds did not use leverage; second, about 54 percent of all hedge funds used less than 2 to

1

leverage; third, about 16 percent of all hedge funds used

fourth, a

few hedge funds used more than

If so,

1

to

1

more than 2

to

1

leverage; and

leverage.

LTCM had very high leverage, 25 times its capital, at the end of 1997.

Furthermore, the leverage ratio became higher due to

high a leverage system that

it

LTCM's

losses.

LTCM had so

could not control "the risk factors present in today's global

markets."^°^

•'^'*

^'"

Merrill

Lynch &Co., supra note 222,

Hearinds

I,

International).
'''Id.
'''

Id

at 8.

supra note 4 (statement of Steven Lonsdorf, President, Van Hedge Fund Advisers

CHAPTERVIII

THE ACTIVITIES OF FINANCIAL COMMUNITY
The President's Working Group on Financial Markets
The

President's

Working Group made a report

(President's

entitled

Working Group)

^'^'^

"Hedge Funds, Leverage

and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management (President's Working Group
Report)" in April 1999."^°^ This report suggested

many methods:

"[improving]

transparency in the [financial] system, [enhancing] private sector risk
practices, [developing]

more

risk-sensitive approaches to adequacy, [supporting]

financial contract netting in the event

centers to

comply with

The

of bankruptcy, and [encouraging] offshore financial

international standards."

report stated that " [t]he near collapse of

participants in our financial system, not only

amount of leverage they assume"

Members

are as follows

:

305

on

its

its

on the

investors, credits,

overall activities."

308

Economic Council,

the Federal Reserve

York, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision.

The

President's

and

Dep. of the Treasury, FED, SEC, CFTC, the Council of Economic Advisers,

Working Group Report, supra note

'''Id
307

to face constraints

and "in the case of LTCM,

the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National

New

LTCM illustrates the need for all

hedge funds,

counterparties did not provide an effective check

^°'*

management

Id

'''Id

54

16.

bank of
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Consequently, the President's Working Group suggested not "direct regulation"
"indirect regulation."^

In January 1999, twelve leading international institutions organized the

improve principles

for reinforcing risk

management

1

999.

HLIs

in the financial

This paper recommended "enhanced information sharing

between counterparties; an analytical framework
liquidity

and

credit risk;

internal limit setting; collateral,

improved

CRMPG

CRMPG made a report, "Improving Counterparty Risk Management

Practices," in June

market

>

practices for banks, securities

firms and, other institutions which offer credit-based services to

markets.^" The

but

'°

The Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group (CRMPG)

to

309

improved credit

for evaluating the effects

risk estimation techniques; stronger

margin and other credit

risk reporting to senior

of leverage on

management and

risk

management

regulators;

practices;

and stronger harmonized

market conventions for key credit documentation."^'^

,n<r

^""^

Direct regulation

is

"the imposition of a range of regulatory requirements directly on a firm— including

requirements to report to regulators on the firm's activities and financial

affairs,

and setting minimum

requirements." Report of the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities

Commissions, Hedge Funds and Other Highly Leveraged Institutions,

IOSCO
^"^

1

n.5 (Nov. 1999) [hereinafter

Report].

The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16.
Improving Counterparty Risk Management Practices (Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group,
June 1999). <http://www.crmpolicygroup.org>; IOSCO Report, supra note 309, at 2.
''-Id

56

The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (Basle Committee)
The Basle Committee made two

papers,

which were made by a Working Group of

the Basle Committee,^''* in January 1999: (1) Banks' Interactions with Highly Leveraged

Institutions

and

(2)

Sound

Practices for Banks' Interactions with Highly Leveraged

Institutions.

Banks' Interactions with Highly Leveraged Institutions

LTCM episode, the Basle Committee indicated the

After reviewing the

insufficiencies in the internal controls

and unsound

risk

management

practices of the

TIC

counterparties to

LTCM.

The paper recommended promoting sound

practices,

enhancing transparency of the activities of large HLIs and other global financial
institutions,

Sound

and regulating HLIs

directly.^

'^

Practices for Banks' Interactions with Highly Leveraged Institutions

This paper recommended sound practices to improve credit risk management

when

dealing with

HLIs as

counterparties.

The

specific

recommendations are as

follows: "(1) establishing clear policies and procedures for banks' involvement with

as part of their overall credit risk environment; (2) information gathering,

and credit analysis of HLIs'

activities, risk,

HLIs

due diligence,

and operations; (3) developing more accurate

measures of exposures resulting from trading and derivatives transactions;

(4) setting

'''Id.
''*

The Working Group on Highly Leveraged

1998.

It

banks' risk

management

address these
^'^

Institutions

was

set

up by the Basle Committee

in

October

has a mission to analyze the nature of the risks posed by highly leveraged institutions, to assess
practices with respect to HLIs, and to evaluate potential policy responses to

risks.

Banks Interactions with Highly Leveraged Institutions, 2-3 (Basle Committee on Banking Supervision,
'

Jan. 1999).
^'^

Id

^'^

A

at 7.

committee of the central banks of the Group of Ten countries.
Sound Practices for Banks Interactions with Highly Leveraged Institution,
Banking Supervision, Jan. 1999).
'

3 (Basle

Committee on
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meaningful overall credit limits for HLIs; (5) linking credit enhancement
collateral

and early termination provisions,

to the specific characteristics

tools, including

of HLIs; and (6)

closely monitoring credit exposure vis-a-vis HLIs, including their trading activities, risk
"5 1

concentration, leverage, and risk

Q

management processes."

The Financial

Stability

Forum (Forum)

'

.

The Finance Ministers of the Group of Seven (G-7) organized
Stability Forum.^'^ Its purpose is that "national

effectively co-operate to

and international communities can more

promote international financial

functioning of the markets, and reduce systemic risk."

vs^orking

the Financial

stability,

improve the

The Forum established three

groups in April 1999.

The Basle Committee and

the Technical

Securities

Together, these organizations

Committee of International Organization of

Commissions (IOSCO)

made

a paper,

"Recommendations

for Public

Disclosure of Trading and Derivatives Activities of Banks and Securities Firms."
this paper, they

made two recommendations:

In

"(1) institutions should provide financial

statement users with a clear picture of their trading and derivatives activities, the major
risks associated with these activities,

and

their

(2) institutions should disclose information

'''Id
^'^

IOSCO

'''Id
'''

Id

'''Id

at 3.

Report, supra note 309, at 2.

performance

produced by

in

managing these

their internal risk

risks;

and

measurement

'

'

I

''

.

.

.

t

.

, .

;

.'
,

,

'

.

•

-1

;

'

;.'

"«'i

;^ f

I

58

and management systems on

their risk exposures

and actual performance

in

managing

these exposures."

The Committee on

the Global Financial

System (CGFS)

>

-

The CGFS, former Euro-Currency Standing Committee, established two working
groups to "address the need for additional information in the marketplace:" the "Working

Group on Disclosure" and

the

"Working Group on Market

of the Working Group on Disclosure

is

to explore

Information."^^''

The purpose

"what information should be publicly

disclosed by financial intermediaries to provide a clear view of their exposures to market

and

credit risks,"

consider

"how

and the focus of the Working group on Market Information

is

to

the provision of additional aggregate market information could improve

the fiinctioning and stability of markets

more informed policy

decisions.

by contributing

to better risk

management and

"^'^^

IOSCO
After the near collapse of LTCM, the Technical Committee of the
established a special Task Force

Institutions (Task Force).

activities

of HLIs.

Leveraged

'''Id
'''Id.

"'Id
'''Idati.
'''Id

'"Id

Its

IOSCO

on Hedge Funds and Other Highly Leveraged

aim was

to handle regulatory issues concerning the

The Task Force released a paper: "Hedge Funds and Other Highly

Institutions."

59

This paper

made

several recommendations: "(1) strengthening risk

management

processes at securities firms that act as counterparties to HLIs; (2) guidance to securities
regulators

the

on the scrutiny which should be applied

means by which firms should be encouraged

information flows about

HLI

to

to regulated firms handling

HLIs and

adopt sound practices; (3) improving

activities to regulated counterparties

of HLIs, regulators,

market authorities and to the public more generally; and (4) the advisability of ftirther

work by IOSCO

in cooperation with other interested parties, including the Basle

Committee and private sector groups."

''' Id.

ZiU-xl

CHAPTER VIX
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF REGULATION
Law Professors'

Opinions

There were many hearings in the United States

after

LTCM's

rescue. During

those hearings in the House and Senate, a few law professors presented their opinions on
regulation of hedge funds. Table 6

Table

David

shows

the

summary of their

Law Professors recommendations
Name

6:

S.

opinions.

'

Ruder

-Oct.
-

-

1,

Recommendations

1998 Hearing
SEC use emergency power

examine carefully
Necessary information should be placed in the hands of
If

needed,

responsible regulators

Henry T.C.

Hu

-Oct.
-

1,

Some

who

to

will preserve

its

confidentiality

1998 Hearing

issues occurred

(complex-exotic financial products, issues of transparency as to
products and institutions, multiple national jurisdictions, and the
optimal as well as feasible limits of regulatory reach)

John C. Coffee,

Jr.

-

-

May

6,

1999 Hearing

Additional hedge fund regulation does not need to protect

investors, counterparties, or creditors, except at the international

G7

level

- Appropriate legislative focus should be on excessive leverage
and the deficiencies in the risk management practices of banks
and securities firms, not investor protection

Source: data from hearings (Oct.

1,

1998,

May

6,

1999)

The Hedge Funds Disclosure Act
Richard Baker, a republican Congressman, introduced "The Hedge Fund
Disclosure Act" in order to require "unregulated hedge funds" to submit regular reports
to the FED."'^° This

330

A republican

proposed legislation requires large ftmds to make themselves and

Richard Baker introduced. H.R.2924, 106* Cong. (1999).

60

61

their financial dealings transparent to the public

Moreover, under the proposed

bill,

a hedge fund with

with assets in excess of $20 billion must

Department, and the SEC.

This

and to securities and banking regulators.

file

i.e.,

billion

quarterly reports with the

bill is criticized,

very small number of hedge funds,

more than $3

however, because

it

of capital or

FED,

the Treasury

applies only to a

fewer than ten will be regulated under the

bill

'ITT

from among about 5,830 hedge funds.
In

my view, this regulation of hedge

order to regulate hedge funds,

we must

first

funds

is

a welcomed

first step.

However,

consider the definition of hedge funds.

in

If

hedge funds are described as a type of mutual fund, even though there are some
differences, then mutual fund regulations can be applied to

bill

hedge funds. In addition,

requests that hedge fund information should be revealed to the public, but, in

this

my

opinion, this information should be limited to regulators.

Benefits and Costs in Regulation of Hedge Funds

Table 7 shows the benefits and costs of regulation and deregulation. In
regulation, there are

two approaches.

First, direct

regulation imposes regulatory

requirements directly on hedge funds by, for example, reporting their activities and
financial statements

and setting minimum requirements.^^"* Second, indirect regulation

controls hedge funds indirectly through counterparties such as banks, securities firms,

and other

institutions

which have relationships with hedge

fionds

through trading

"' Section 4. (Public reports required).
Id.

"' M. Corey Goldman, supra note

1.

^^^

"There are a number of critical obstacles to the direct regulation HLIs. It cited difficulties in giving a
precise legal definition of "highly leveraged institution." in the "Report on Highly Leveraged Institutions"
(HILs). Basle Committee Urges
""•

IOSCO

Hedge Funds Risk Assessment, REUTERS,

Report, supra note 309.

Jan. 28, 1999.
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transactions or the lending of money. Regulators can get a great deal of information from

hedge funds through

direct regulation, but this has

some disadvantages

for

hedge funds

can have disadvantage because their rivals can get their confidential information. In

hedge funds do not

addition,

like direct regulation

On the

deregulation and flexible management.

because they are accustomed to

other hand, indirect regulation has less

regulation effect because hedge funds' counterparties control them.

practices,

banks and

securities firms indirectly regulate

the possibility of returning to

>

unsound practices as

With sound

hedge funds. However, there

in the

LTCM case.

If regulators

is

and

counterparties do not regulate hedge funds, potential risks or market turbulence will

continue to exist in the financial market.

Table

7:

Comparison between regulation and deregulation
Costs

Benefits
Direct Regulation

-Protect potential risk or

-An exodus of U.S. hedge

turbulence in the financial

funds to offshore

market

-

-Investor protection

confidentiality to rivals

Disclosure

management

-Inflexibility in

management
-Interference in financial

innovation
Indirect Regulation

-Protect potential risk or

-Less regulation effect

turbulence in the financial

-The possibility of return to

market

unsound practices

-Investor protection

Deregulation

management
management

-Flexibility in

-Existence of potential risk

-Protect

-No investors protection

privacy
-Prevent an exodus of U.S.
hedge funds to offshore
Source: data from summary.
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Discussion
Financial Innovation exceeds Regulation

Some

experts argue that

and base regulation upon

it

in a

"it is illogical to

focus upon a category of instruments

world of financial innovation

in

which new instruments

outside the definitional boundaries of the law continually arise."

they

recommended

practices' [—

sales

that "the optimal

approach

is

From

this

viewpoint,

a global voluntary initiative of 'best

market risk management, credit procedures, and information

availability,

and documentation practices, and internal and external audits—] that covers not only

major commercial and investment banks, but also significant end users, including hedge
funds such as LTCM."^^^
If an instrument threatens the

differently.

In the

above-mentioned

practices," did not work.

On

world financial market, however,

MIF

case, external auditors,

we

should think

one of the "best

the other hand, Julian Robertson, the operator of one of the

world's foremost hedge fund, stated that "some additional regulation in [the
transparency] area

would be

beneficial. "^^^Additionally, in

my judgment, hedge

funds are

one of derivatives of mutual funds. The regulation of hedge funds, therefore, would not
be

difficult.

^^^

Thomas A. Russo and Marlisa

'''Id.

Vinciguerra, supra note 245.

64

Significant Public Interest

After

LTCM's

near-bankruptcy and bailout, arguments have continued about the
TT O

necessity of new regulatory measures and the character of regulation in hedge funds.

The idea of investor protection

in

investors can protect their risk

on

hedge funds
their

ovm.

and sophisticated

that wealthy

is

If all investors

were

wealthy people, there would be no argument because the bankruptcy of the hedge

fund would just be the problem of individuals.
In fact, most investors in hedge ftinds during the 1960's and 1970's were "private

individuals.""''^°After that,

"feeder funds"

endowment
hedge

became

however, "high net worth" individuals, "fiind of funds," and

investors in hedge funds.^"*^ In addition, private banks, university

funds, pension plans, and insurance companies appeared as investors in

funds.^"*^

Nowadays, most

institutions, for

example, investment banks, insurance

companies, and commercial banks, invest in hedge funds. In 1996, pension funds and
other qualified plans comprised 14 percent, and
-

6 percent.

endowments and foundations comprised

343

If there is a big loss in the

institutions will receive the

same

hedge funds
loss.

in

which they

invest, the investors

of those

Also, fiduciary institutions, for example, pension

funds and charity foundations, invest in hedge funds; thus, the failure of hedge funds will

'^^

Remarks of Brooksley Bom, Chairperson Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Fordham
Law 1999 Derivatives & Risk Management Symposium (Jan. 28, 1999).

University School

<http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches/bom-42.htm>
^^*

See Thomas A. Russo and Marlisa Vinciguerra, supra note 245.
"' See Franklin R. Edwards, supra note 2 at 1 90-9 The task Force on Hedge Funds, supra note 122.
1
''*"
See Matthias Bekier, supra note 20, at 98.
^'^
See Id.
342
See generally Id. at 98-99.
^^^
One BadApplel supra note 284.
1

,

;
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have effects on the beneficiaries of the fiduciary

hedge funds can be a
example,

in the

social

institutions.

If so, the

problem and can be of "significant public

LTCM debacle, both the

St.

bankruptcy of

interest."

Foe

Johns University endowment fund and the

University of Pittsburgh were investors and both suffered.^"^^ In those cases,

we

should

handle the situation differently.

When we

consider

UBS'

situation with regard to

LTCM,

it

appears to be urgent to

protect the investors in hedge funds. In reality, sophisticated investors do not evaluate

the merits and risks of their investments in hedge funds as

episode. Usually, hedge funds borrow

investments."'''^

and banks

Thus,

if

money from banks

hedge funds have large

will be negatively impacted.

we can

see in the

LTCM

to leverage their

losses, they will default

on

their loans,

Banks should become aware of and consider

the

inherent risks of investing in hedge funds.

Banks should

also check their loans for

hedge funds.

However,

in reality,

banks

often do not pay attention to those risks, but merely rely on the reputation of managers of

hedge funds, as

more

in

LTCM.

If the counterparty risks to

precision, banks will be able to predict risks

hedge funds are calculated with

and avoid a financial

fiasco.

Exodus of U.S. Hedge Funds

Most

regulators worry about an "exodus" of U.S. hedge funds to offshore as a

result of the regulation

of hedge funds

in the

United

States."'''^

In addition, regulators

argue that the "exodus" of U.S. hedge funds indicates that "the business would be

^'^
^'*^

^^

'''*

See Franklin R. Edwards, supra note 21, at 190-91.
David Shirreff, supra note 239.
See Hearings 1, supra note 4 (statement of John P. La Ware, Member, FED).
See Hearings I, supra note 4 (statement of Rep. Bernard Sanders).
After

before.

LTCM episode, regulators

focused on this counterparty

risk: thus, there are

more

regulations than

66

transplanted in jurisdictions with weaker or nonexistent regulatory regimes and less

developed legal and judicial systems, with the result of increasing systemic risk
worldwide."^^^
questionable whether hedge funds can be effectively directly

It is

regulated in the United States alone. While their financial clout

may

hedge funds' physical presence is small. Given the amazing
communication capabilities available virtually around the globe, trades
can be initiated from almost any location. Indeed, most hedge funds
are only a short step from cyberspace. Any direct U.S. regulations

be

large,

induce the more aggressive

restricting their flexibility will doubtless

funds to emigrate from under our jurisdiction. The best

my judgment

is

U.S

far better

hedge funds'

move

abroad, our oversight will

^^'

However, about 70 percent of hedge fund
already had "offshore jurisdiction."

when hedge

fiinds trade

If there are

assets under

some

management

CFTC

and

in

1

997

relationships with the U.S.

on U.S. Futures and Option Exchange or have U.S.

hedge funds must be registered with
there will be

We are thus able to

activity, especially as they influence

financial markets. If the funds

diminish.

in

what we do today: Regulate them indirectly through

the regulation of the sources of their funds.

monitor

we can do

(i.e.,

investors),

NFA under the CEA provision.

Thus,

no difference from the current system. Therefore, the "exodus" of U.S.

hedge funds will not be a big problem.

^^

See Thomas A. Russo and Marlisa Vinciguerra, supra note 245; Barry Eichengreen

at 23.
350
^^°
351

Thomas A. Russo and Marlisa
Hearings

Vinciguerra,

Id.

supra note 4 (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, FED).
"^ Barry Eichengreen et al., supra note 27, at 32 Table 3.3 (source: Mar/Hedge).
I,

et al.,

supra note 27,
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Moral Hazard
It is

worth mentioning that Meriwether

established a

and his former

"^

new hedge fund whose investment

five partners

strategies are similar to LTCM's^^'* since

negotiating with Wall Street executives about the possibility of creating a

LTCM was a limited partnership, but
Reserve. Even though

A

news

was

new

in

it

received

ACM received sanctions from the SEC.

story indicated the morality of Meriwether.

deed' transfering a 20-acre vacant

fund.^^^

bailed out by the intervention of the Federal

LTCM caused major problems in the financial market,

no penalty whereas Askin

^^^

it

have

lot in

"Meriwether signed an 'interspousal transfer grant

a tony residential area of Pebble Beach, Calif, to his wife...

A

Week examination of public records shows that long before the Aug.27 transfer, Meriwether had
shielded his own and his partners assets in the event LTCM ever got into trouble." Meriwether Transferred
Property to Wife During LTCM's Fall, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct.8, 1998.
Business

<http://www.businesswire.com/webbox/bw.1008998/831675.htm>
^^*
Sholes is doing business in "a new on-line trading venture," and Merton
Morgan consultant. Trillion Dollar Bet, supra note 256.
^

LTCM to Repay Debts Original Investors in Long-Term

1999.

Capital to Get

is at

Harvard University and JP

Money Back, CNNfn,

Jan.

1

8,

CHAPTER VX
CONCLUSION
Merton confessed
truck,"

and Sholes stated

are] the reason.

It

that

"[LTCM's near-bankruptcy was]

like getting hit

that "I personally don't think that [the Black-Scholes

could be inputs to the models,

could be a combination of many things.

And

it

know

[whether the

what

[the reason for

LTCM episode]

so just saying models were flawed

LTCM's

debacle] would be, but

was a random event or whether

was caused by] negligence on [LTCM] and [LTCM's]
The

interest" should

"essentially unregulated

FRBNY,
I

don't yet

LTCM episode

creditors' parts."

be solved. If something causes "a public policy issue,"

my judgment,

The

LTCM case also presented the cost of

deregulation and the cost of regulation of hedge funds.
indicated the huge potential cost of deregulation.

Trillion Dollar Bet,

hedge funds are

mutual funds," thus, the concept of regulation should come from

the regulation system of mutual funds.

^

not

United States and the world. The conflict between "flexible management"

regulators should take an action. Furthermore, in

it

[the

is

it

LTCM case indicates that hedge funds could produce "a significant public

interest" in the

and "public

models

could be the models themselves,

necessarily the right answer."^^^ Peter Fisher, executive vice president of the

said that "I can suppose

by a

supra note 256.

'''Id.
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Even though

it

was just one

case,

69

One

possible reason for the excellent returns of hedge funds could be their
5

CO

freedom from regulation,

thus

we should

not destroy this advantage. However,

we

should consider the regulation of hedge funds step by step. In addition, the starting point

of regulation
In

is

not

commodity but mutual

my view, we

funds.

should have two approaches to regulation of hedge funds.

with respect to investor protection,

if there is the possibility

First,

of the cause of a significant

public interest, regulators should use direct and indirect regulation. For example, if
investors are pension plans or university

endowment

funds, the concept of mutual fiinds

should be adopted. Second, with respect to market turbulence protection, indirect
regulation

is

more

useful.

However,

if there is

an urgent

situation,

emergency power

should be used by regulators. In addition, the cooperation of regulators should be

enhanced by

legislation.

Nobody can confirm whether the
time.

However, the remarks of the

future regulation of hedge funds:

financial] system's dynamics.

institutions

^^^

^^^

and practices

to

FED

"We

We

regulation of hedge funds

a good idea

at this

chairman provide some indications about the

do not yet

fully understand the

are learning fast,

n. 27.

new

[global

and need to update and modify our

reduce the risks inherent in the

See Mark Jickling, supra note 5, at 5.
Outlook Dec. 1998, supra note 1 8, at III, 65,

is

new regime."

L^W

LsDHil^Y
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